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342 lines
12 KiB
HTML
342 lines
12 KiB
HTML
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TODO:
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- Clarify terminology: SSL vs TLS
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Mitmproxy is an enormously flexible tool. Knowing exactly how the proxying
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process works will help you deploy it more creatively, and let you understand
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its fundamental assumptions and how to work around them. This document explains
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mitmproxy's proxy mechanism by example, starting with the simplest explicit
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proxy configuration, and working up to the most complicated interaction -
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transparent proxying of SSL-protected traffic in the presence of SNI.
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<div class="page-header">
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<h1>Explicit HTTP</h1>
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</div>
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Configuring the client to use mitmproxy as an explicit proxy is the simplest
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and most reliable way to intercept traffic. The proxy protocol is codified in
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the [HTTP RFC](http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2068.txt), so the behaviour of both
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the client and the server is well defined, and usually reliable. In the
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simplest possible interaction with mitmproxy, a client connects directly to the
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proxy, and makes a request that looks like this:
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<pre>GET http://example.com/index.html HTTP/1.1</pre>
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This is a proxy GET request - an extended form of the vanilla HTTP GET request
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that includes a schema and host specification, and it includes all the
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information mitmproxy needs to proceed.
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<img src="explicit.png"/>
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<table class="table">
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<tbody>
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<tr>
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<td><b>1</b></td>
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<td>The client connects to the proxy and makes a request.</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<td><b>2</b></td>
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<td>Mitmproxy connects to the upstream server and simply forwards
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the request on.</td>
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</tr>
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</tbody>
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</table>
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<div class="page-header">
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<h1>Explicit HTTPS</h1>
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</div>
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The process for an explicitly proxied HTTPS connection is quite different. The
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client connects to the proxy and makes a request that looks like this:
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<pre>CONNECT example.com:443 HTTP/1.1</pre>
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A conventional proxy can neither view nor manipulate an SSL-encrypted data
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stream, so a CONNECT request simply asks the proxy to open a pipe between the
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client and server. The proxy here is just a facilitator - it blindly forwards
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data in both directions without knowing anything about the contents. The
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negotiation of the SSL connection happens over this pipe, and the subsequent
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flow of requests and responses are completely opaque to the proxy.
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## The MITM in mitmproxy
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This is where mitmproxy's fundamental trick comes in to play. The MITM in its
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name stands for Man-In-The-Middle - a reference to the process we use to
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intercept and interfere with these theoretially opaque data streams. The basic
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idea is to pretend to be the server to the client, and pretend to be the client
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to the server. The tricky part is that the Certificate Authority system is
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designed to prevent exactly this attack, by allowing a trusted third-party to
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cryptographically sign a server's SSL certificates to verify that the certs are
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legit. If this signature is from a non-trusted party, a secure client will
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simply drop the connection and refuse to proceed. Despite the many shortcomings
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of the CA system as it exists today, this is usually fatal to attempts to MITM
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an SSL connection for analysis.
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Our answer to this conundrum is to become a trusted Certificate Authority
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ourselves. Mitmproxy includes a full CA implementation that generates
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interception certificates on the fly. To get the client to trust these
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certificates, we register mitmproxy as a CA with the device manually.
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## Complication 1: What's the remote hostname?
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To proceed with this plan, we need to know the domain name to use in the
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interception certificate - the client will verify that the certificate is for
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the domain it's connecting to, and abort if this is not the case. At first
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blush, it seems that the CONNECT request above gives us all we need - in this
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example, both of these values are "example.com". But what if the client had
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initiated the connection as follows:
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<pre>CONNECT 10.1.1.1:443 HTTP/1.1</pre>
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Using the IP address is perfectly legitimate because it gives us enough
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information to initiate the pipe, even though it doesn't reveal the remote
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hostname.
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Mitmproxy has a cunning mechanism that smooths this over - upstream certificate
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sniffing. As soon as we see the CONNECT request, we pause the client part of
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the conversation, and initiate a simultaneous connection to the server. We
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complete the SSL handshake with the server, and inspect the certificates it
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used. Now, we use the Common Name in the upstream SSL certificates to generate
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the dummy certificate for the client. Voila, we have the correct hostname to
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present to the client, even if it was never specified.
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## Complication 2: Subject Alternate Name
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Enter the next complication. Sometimes, the certificate Common Name is not, in
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fact, the hostname that the client is connecting to. This is because of the
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optional Subject Alternate Name field in the SSL certificate that allows an
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arbitrary number of alternate domains to be specified. If the expected domain
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matches any of these, the client wil proceed, even though the domain doesn't
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match the certificate Common Name. The answer here is simple: when extract the
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CN from the upstream cert, we also extract the SANs, and add them to the
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generated dummy certificate.
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## Complication 3: Server Name Indication
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One of the big limitations of conventional SSL is that each certificate
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requires its own IP address. This means that you couldn't do virtual hosting
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where multiple domains with independent certificates share the same IP address.
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In a world with a rapidly shrinking IPv4 address pool this is a problem, and we
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have a solution in the form of the Server Name Indication extension to the SSL
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and TLS protocols. This lets the client specify the remote server name at the
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start of the SSL handshake, which then lets the server select the right
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certificate to complete the process.
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SNI breaks our upstream certificate sniffing process, because when we connect
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without using SNI, we get served a default certificate that may have nothing to
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do with the certificate expected by the client. The solution is another tricky
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complication to the client connection process. After the client connects, we
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allow the SSL handshake to continue until just _after_ the SNI value has been
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passed to us. Now we can pause the conversation, and initiate an upstream
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connection using the correct SNI value, which then serves us the correct
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upstream certificate, from which we can extract the expected CN and SANs.
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## Putting it all together
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Lets put all of this together into the complete explicitly proxied HTTPS flow.
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<img src="explicit_https.png"/>
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<table class="table">
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<tbody>
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<tr>
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<td><b>1</b></td>
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<td>The client makes a connection to mitmproxy, and issues an HTTP
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CONNECT request.</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<td><b>2</b></td>
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<td>Mitmproxy responds with a 200 Connection Established, as if it
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has set up the CONNECT pipe.</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<td><b>3</b></td>
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<td>The client believes it's talking to the remote server, and
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initiates the SSL connection. It uses SNI to indicate the hostname
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it is connecting to.</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<td><b>4</b></td>
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<td>Mitmproxy connects to the server, and establishes an SSL
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connection using the SNI hostname indicated by the client.</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<td><b>5</b></td>
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<td>The server responds with the matching SSL certificate, which
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contains the CN and SAN values needed to generate the interception
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certificate.</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<td><b>6</b></td>
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<td>Mitmproxy generates the interception cert, and continues the
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client SSL handshake paused in step 3.</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<td><b>7</b></td>
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<td>The client sends the request over the established SSL
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connection.</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<td><b>7</b></td>
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<td>Mitmproxy passes the request on to the server over the SSL
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connection initiated in step 4.</td>
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</tr>
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</tbody>
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</table>
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<div class="page-header">
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<h1>Transparent HTTP</h1>
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</div>
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When a transparent proxy is used, the HTTP/S connection is redirected into a
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proxy at the network layer, without any client configuration being required.
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This makes transparent proxying ideal for those situations where you can't
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change client behaviour - proxy-oblivious Android applications being a common
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example.
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To achieve this, we need to introduce two extra components. The first new
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component is a router that transparently redirects the TCP connection to the
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proxy. Once the client has initiated the connection, it makes a vanilla HTTP
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request, which might look something like this:
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<pre>GET /index.html HTTP/1.1</pre>
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Note that this request differs from the explicit proxy variation, in that it
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omits the scheme and hostname. How, then, do we know which upstream host to
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forward the request to? The routing mechanism that has performed the
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redirection keeps track of the original destination. Each different routing
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mechanism has its own ideosyncratic way of exposing this data, so this
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introduces the second component required for working transparent proxying: a
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host module that knows how to retrieve the original destination address from
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the router. Once we have this information, the process is fairly
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straight-forward.
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<img src="transparent.png"/>
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<table class="table">
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<tbody>
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<tr>
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<td><b>1</b></td>
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<td>The client makes a connection to the server.</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<td><b>2</b></td>
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<td>The router redirects the connection to mitmproxy, which is
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typically listening on a local port of the same host. Mitmproxy
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then consults the routing mechanism to establish what the original
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destination was.</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<td><b>3</b></td>
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<td>Now, we simply read the client's request...</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<td><b>4</b></td>
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<td>... and forward it upstream.</td>
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</tr>
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</tbody>
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</table>
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<div class="page-header">
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<h1>Transparent HTTPS</h1>
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</div>
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The process for transparently proxying an HTTPS request is a merger of the
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methods we've outlined for transparently proxying HTTP, and explicitly proxying
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HTTPS. We use the routing mechanism to establish the upstream server address,
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and then proceed as for explit HTTPS connections to establish the CN and SANs,
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and cope with SNI.
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<img src="transparent_https.png"/>
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<table class="table">
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<tbody>
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<tr>
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<td><b>1</b></td>
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<td>The client makes a connection to the server.</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<td><b>2</b></td>
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<td>The router redirects the connection to mitmproxy, which is
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typically listening on a local port of the same host. Mitmproxy
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then consults the routing mechanism to establish what the original
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destination was.</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<td><b>3</b></td>
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<td>The client believes it's talking to the remote server, and
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initiates the SSL connection. It uses SNI to indicate the hostname
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it is connecting to.</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<td><b>4</b></td>
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<td>Mitmproxy connects to the server, and establishes an SSL
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connection using the SNI hostname indicated by the client.</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<td><b>5</b></td>
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<td>The server responds with the matching SSL certificate, which
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contains the CN and SAN values needed to generate the interception
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certificate.</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<td><b>6</b></td>
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<td>Mitmproxy generates the interception cert, and continues the
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client SSL handshake paused in step 3.</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<td><b>7</b></td>
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<td>The client sends the request over the established SSL
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connection.</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<td><b>7</b></td>
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<td>Mitmproxy passes the request on to the server over the SSL
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connection initiated in step 4.</td>
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</tr>
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</tbody>
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</table>
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