This is a common task in pentesting scenarios. This commit adds the following
functions:
utils.Headers.replace
proxy.Request.replace
proxy.Response.replace
flow.Flow.replace
Since OpenSSL doesn't let us set certificate start times in the past, the
client and proxy machine time must be synchronized, or the client might reject
the certificate. We can bodgy over small discrepancies by waiting a few seconds
after a new certificate is generated (i.e. the first time an SSL domain is contacted).
Make this a configurable option, and turn it off by default.
Two different strategies here:
- Use a simple heuristic to detect if we're looking at XML data when indent
mode is used. On non-XML data we can hang even on small documents.
- Only view partial data for large bodies. At the moment the cutoff is
100k. I might finetune this later.
- The OpenSSL x509 has no way to explicitly set the notBefore value on
certificates.
- If two systems have the same configured time, it's possible to return a
certificate before the validity start time has arrived.
- We "solve" this by waiting for one second when a certificate is first
generated before returning the cert. The alternative is to rewrite pretty much
all of our certificate generation, a thought too horrible to contemplate.
This option reads a set of flows from a file. I've also regularized the
mitmdump and mitmproxy command-line signatures by removing mitmproxy's old way
of specifying flow loads through naked arguments.
This allows us to replay an HTTP Authorization header, in the same way as we
replay cookies using stickycookies. This lets us conveniently get at HTTP Basic
Auth protected resources through the proxy, but is not enough to do the same
for HTTP Digest auth. We'll put that on the todo list.
We now create three different files in the .mitmproxy directory when a dummy CA
is made:
mitmproxy-ca.pem - the CA, including private key
mitmproxy-ca-cert.p12 - A pkcs12 version of the certificate, for distribution to Windows.
mitmproxy-ca-cert.pem - A PEM version of the certificate, for distribution to everyone else.
For some reason Satan's Operating System doesn't join up the certification path
if the key identifiers are set to hash. This took a few hours of trial and
error to figure out.
