208 lines
7.4 KiB
C
208 lines
7.4 KiB
C
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/* Copyright 2016 Brian Smith.
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*
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* Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
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* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
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* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
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*
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* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
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* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
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* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
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* SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
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* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
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* OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
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* CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
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#include <openssl/bn.h>
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#include <assert.h>
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#include "internal.h"
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#include "../../internal.h"
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static uint64_t bn_neg_inv_mod_r_u64(uint64_t n);
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OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS == 1 || BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS == 2,
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BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS_VALUE_INVALID_2);
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OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(sizeof(uint64_t) ==
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BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS * sizeof(BN_ULONG),
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BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS_DOES_NOT_MATCH_UINT64_T);
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// LG_LITTLE_R is log_2(r).
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#define LG_LITTLE_R (BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS * BN_BITS2)
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uint64_t bn_mont_n0(const BIGNUM *n) {
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// These conditions are checked by the caller, |BN_MONT_CTX_set|.
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assert(!BN_is_zero(n));
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assert(!BN_is_negative(n));
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assert(BN_is_odd(n));
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// r == 2**(BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS * BN_BITS2) and LG_LITTLE_R == lg(r). This
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// ensures that we can do integer division by |r| by simply ignoring
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// |BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS| limbs. Similarly, we can calculate values modulo
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// |r| by just looking at the lowest |BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS| limbs. This is
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// what makes Montgomery multiplication efficient.
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//
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// As shown in Algorithm 1 of "Fast Prime Field Elliptic Curve Cryptography
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// with 256 Bit Primes" by Shay Gueron and Vlad Krasnov, in the loop of a
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// multi-limb Montgomery multiplication of |a * b (mod n)|, given the
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// unreduced product |t == a * b|, we repeatedly calculate:
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//
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// t1 := t % r |t1| is |t|'s lowest limb (see previous paragraph).
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// t2 := t1*n0*n
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// t3 := t + t2
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// t := t3 / r copy all limbs of |t3| except the lowest to |t|.
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//
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// In the last step, it would only make sense to ignore the lowest limb of
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// |t3| if it were zero. The middle steps ensure that this is the case:
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//
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// t3 == 0 (mod r)
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// t + t2 == 0 (mod r)
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// t + t1*n0*n == 0 (mod r)
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// t1*n0*n == -t (mod r)
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// t*n0*n == -t (mod r)
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// n0*n == -1 (mod r)
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// n0 == -1/n (mod r)
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//
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// Thus, in each iteration of the loop, we multiply by the constant factor
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// |n0|, the negative inverse of n (mod r).
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// n_mod_r = n % r. As explained above, this is done by taking the lowest
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// |BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS| limbs of |n|.
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uint64_t n_mod_r = n->d[0];
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#if BN_MONT_CTX_N0_LIMBS == 2
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if (n->top > 1) {
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n_mod_r |= (uint64_t)n->d[1] << BN_BITS2;
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}
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#endif
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return bn_neg_inv_mod_r_u64(n_mod_r);
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}
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// bn_neg_inv_r_mod_n_u64 calculates the -1/n mod r; i.e. it calculates |v|
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// such that u*r - v*n == 1. |r| is the constant defined in |bn_mont_n0|. |n|
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// must be odd.
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//
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// This is derived from |xbinGCD| in Henry S. Warren, Jr.'s "Montgomery
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// Multiplication" (http://www.hackersdelight.org/MontgomeryMultiplication.pdf).
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// It is very similar to the MODULAR-INVERSE function in Stephen R. Dussé's and
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// Burton S. Kaliski Jr.'s "A Cryptographic Library for the Motorola DSP56000"
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// (http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F3-540-46877-3_21).
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//
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// This is inspired by Joppe W. Bos's "Constant Time Modular Inversion"
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// (http://www.joppebos.com/files/CTInversion.pdf) so that the inversion is
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// constant-time with respect to |n|. We assume uint64_t additions,
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// subtractions, shifts, and bitwise operations are all constant time, which
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// may be a large leap of faith on 32-bit targets. We avoid division and
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// multiplication, which tend to be the most problematic in terms of timing
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// leaks.
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//
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// Most GCD implementations return values such that |u*r + v*n == 1|, so the
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// caller would have to negate the resultant |v| for the purpose of Montgomery
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// multiplication. This implementation does the negation implicitly by doing
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// the computations as a difference instead of a sum.
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static uint64_t bn_neg_inv_mod_r_u64(uint64_t n) {
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assert(n % 2 == 1);
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// alpha == 2**(lg r - 1) == r / 2.
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static const uint64_t alpha = UINT64_C(1) << (LG_LITTLE_R - 1);
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const uint64_t beta = n;
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uint64_t u = 1;
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uint64_t v = 0;
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// The invariant maintained from here on is:
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// 2**(lg r - i) == u*2*alpha - v*beta.
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for (size_t i = 0; i < LG_LITTLE_R; ++i) {
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#if BN_BITS2 == 64 && defined(BN_ULLONG)
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assert((BN_ULLONG)(1) << (LG_LITTLE_R - i) ==
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((BN_ULLONG)u * 2 * alpha) - ((BN_ULLONG)v * beta));
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#endif
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// Delete a common factor of 2 in u and v if |u| is even. Otherwise, set
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// |u = (u + beta) / 2| and |v = (v / 2) + alpha|.
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uint64_t u_is_odd = UINT64_C(0) - (u & 1); // Either 0xff..ff or 0.
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// The addition can overflow, so use Dietz's method for it.
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//
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// Dietz calculates (x+y)/2 by (x⊕y)>>1 + x&y. This is valid for all
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// (unsigned) x and y, even when x+y overflows. Evidence for 32-bit values
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// (embedded in 64 bits to so that overflow can be ignored):
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//
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// (declare-fun x () (_ BitVec 64))
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// (declare-fun y () (_ BitVec 64))
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// (assert (let (
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// (one (_ bv1 64))
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// (thirtyTwo (_ bv32 64)))
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// (and
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// (bvult x (bvshl one thirtyTwo))
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// (bvult y (bvshl one thirtyTwo))
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// (not (=
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// (bvadd (bvlshr (bvxor x y) one) (bvand x y))
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// (bvlshr (bvadd x y) one)))
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// )))
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// (check-sat)
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uint64_t beta_if_u_is_odd = beta & u_is_odd; // Either |beta| or 0.
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u = ((u ^ beta_if_u_is_odd) >> 1) + (u & beta_if_u_is_odd);
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uint64_t alpha_if_u_is_odd = alpha & u_is_odd; // Either |alpha| or 0.
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v = (v >> 1) + alpha_if_u_is_odd;
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}
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// The invariant now shows that u*r - v*n == 1 since r == 2 * alpha.
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#if BN_BITS2 == 64 && defined(BN_ULLONG)
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assert(1 == ((BN_ULLONG)u * 2 * alpha) - ((BN_ULLONG)v * beta));
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#endif
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return v;
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}
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// bn_mod_exp_base_2_vartime calculates r = 2**p (mod n). |p| must be larger
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// than log_2(n); i.e. 2**p must be larger than |n|. |n| must be positive and
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// odd.
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int bn_mod_exp_base_2_vartime(BIGNUM *r, unsigned p, const BIGNUM *n) {
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assert(!BN_is_zero(n));
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assert(!BN_is_negative(n));
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assert(BN_is_odd(n));
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BN_zero(r);
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unsigned n_bits = BN_num_bits(n);
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assert(n_bits != 0);
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if (n_bits == 1) {
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return 1;
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}
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// Set |r| to the smallest power of two larger than |n|.
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assert(p > n_bits);
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if (!BN_set_bit(r, n_bits)) {
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return 0;
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}
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// Unconditionally reduce |r|.
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assert(BN_cmp(r, n) > 0);
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if (!BN_usub(r, r, n)) {
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return 0;
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}
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assert(BN_cmp(r, n) < 0);
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for (unsigned i = n_bits; i < p; ++i) {
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// This is like |BN_mod_lshift1_quick| except using |BN_usub|.
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//
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// TODO: Replace this with the use of a constant-time variant of
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// |BN_mod_lshift1_quick|.
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if (!BN_lshift1(r, r)) {
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return 0;
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}
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if (BN_cmp(r, n) >= 0) {
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if (!BN_usub(r, r, n)) {
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return 0;
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}
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}
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}
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return 1;
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}
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