845 lines
26 KiB
C
845 lines
26 KiB
C
/* v3_purp.c */
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/*
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* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project
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* 2001.
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*/
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright (c) 1999-2004 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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*
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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*
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
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* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
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* distribution.
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*
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
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* software must display the following acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
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*
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* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
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* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
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* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
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* licensing@OpenSSL.org.
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*
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* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
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* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
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* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
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*
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* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
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* acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
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* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
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* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
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* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
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* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
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* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
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* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
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* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
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* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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* ====================================================================
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*
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* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
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* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
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* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <openssl/buf.h>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include <openssl/digest.h>
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#include <openssl/mem.h>
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#include <openssl/obj.h>
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#include <openssl/thread.h>
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#include <openssl/x509_vfy.h>
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#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
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#include "../internal.h"
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#define V1_ROOT (EXFLAG_V1|EXFLAG_SS)
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#define ku_reject(x, usage) \
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(((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_kusage & (usage)))
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#define xku_reject(x, usage) \
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(((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_xkusage & (usage)))
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#define ns_reject(x, usage) \
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(((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) && !((x)->ex_nscert & (usage)))
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static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x);
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static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
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int ca);
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static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
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int ca);
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static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
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int ca);
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static int purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int ca);
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static int check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
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int ca);
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static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
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int ca);
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static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
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int ca);
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static int check_purpose_timestamp_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
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int ca);
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static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
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static int ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
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static int xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE **a, const X509_PURPOSE **b);
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static void xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE *p);
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static X509_PURPOSE xstandard[] = {
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{X509_PURPOSE_SSL_CLIENT, X509_TRUST_SSL_CLIENT, 0,
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check_purpose_ssl_client, (char *)"SSL client", (char *)"sslclient",
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NULL},
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{X509_PURPOSE_SSL_SERVER, X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0,
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check_purpose_ssl_server, (char *)"SSL server", (char *)"sslserver",
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NULL},
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{X509_PURPOSE_NS_SSL_SERVER, X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0,
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check_purpose_ns_ssl_server, (char *)"Netscape SSL server",
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(char *)"nssslserver", NULL},
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{X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_SIGN, X509_TRUST_EMAIL, 0, check_purpose_smime_sign,
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(char *)"S/MIME signing", (char *)"smimesign", NULL},
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{X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_ENCRYPT, X509_TRUST_EMAIL, 0,
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check_purpose_smime_encrypt, (char *)"S/MIME encryption",
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(char *)"smimeencrypt", NULL},
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{X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN, X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, check_purpose_crl_sign,
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(char *)"CRL signing", (char *)"crlsign", NULL},
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{X509_PURPOSE_ANY, X509_TRUST_DEFAULT, 0, no_check, (char *)"Any Purpose",
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(char *)"any", NULL},
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{X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER, X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, ocsp_helper,
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(char *)"OCSP helper", (char *)"ocsphelper", NULL},
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{X509_PURPOSE_TIMESTAMP_SIGN, X509_TRUST_TSA, 0,
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check_purpose_timestamp_sign, (char *)"Time Stamp signing",
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(char *)"timestampsign", NULL},
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};
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#define X509_PURPOSE_COUNT (sizeof(xstandard)/sizeof(X509_PURPOSE))
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static STACK_OF(X509_PURPOSE) *xptable = NULL;
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static int xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE **a, const X509_PURPOSE **b)
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{
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return (*a)->purpose - (*b)->purpose;
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}
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/*
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* As much as I'd like to make X509_check_purpose use a "const" X509* I
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* really can't because it does recalculate hashes and do other non-const
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* things.
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*/
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int X509_check_purpose(X509 *x, int id, int ca)
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{
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int idx;
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const X509_PURPOSE *pt;
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x509v3_cache_extensions(x);
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if (id == -1)
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return 1;
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idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id);
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if (idx == -1)
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return -1;
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pt = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
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return pt->check_purpose(pt, x, ca);
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}
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int X509_PURPOSE_set(int *p, int purpose)
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{
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if (X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose) == -1) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509V3, X509V3_R_INVALID_PURPOSE);
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return 0;
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}
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*p = purpose;
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return 1;
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}
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int X509_PURPOSE_get_count(void)
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{
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if (!xptable)
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return X509_PURPOSE_COUNT;
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return sk_X509_PURPOSE_num(xptable) + X509_PURPOSE_COUNT;
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}
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X509_PURPOSE *X509_PURPOSE_get0(int idx)
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{
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if (idx < 0)
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return NULL;
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if (idx < (int)X509_PURPOSE_COUNT)
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return xstandard + idx;
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return sk_X509_PURPOSE_value(xptable, idx - X509_PURPOSE_COUNT);
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}
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int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_sname(char *sname)
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{
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int i;
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X509_PURPOSE *xptmp;
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for (i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_get_count(); i++) {
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xptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(i);
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if (!strcmp(xptmp->sname, sname))
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return i;
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}
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return -1;
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}
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int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(int purpose)
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{
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X509_PURPOSE tmp;
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size_t idx;
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if ((purpose >= X509_PURPOSE_MIN) && (purpose <= X509_PURPOSE_MAX))
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return purpose - X509_PURPOSE_MIN;
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tmp.purpose = purpose;
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if (!xptable)
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return -1;
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sk_X509_PURPOSE_sort(xptable);
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if (!sk_X509_PURPOSE_find(xptable, &idx, &tmp))
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return -1;
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return idx + X509_PURPOSE_COUNT;
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}
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int X509_PURPOSE_add(int id, int trust, int flags,
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int (*ck) (const X509_PURPOSE *, const X509 *, int),
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char *name, char *sname, void *arg)
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{
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int idx;
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X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
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char *name_dup, *sname_dup;
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/*
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* This is set according to what we change: application can't set it
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*/
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flags &= ~X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC;
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/* This will always be set for application modified trust entries */
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flags |= X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME;
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/* Get existing entry if any */
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idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id);
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/* Need a new entry */
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if (idx == -1) {
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if (!(ptmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_PURPOSE)))) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509V3, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return 0;
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}
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ptmp->flags = X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC;
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} else
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ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
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/* Duplicate the supplied names. */
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name_dup = BUF_strdup(name);
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sname_dup = BUF_strdup(sname);
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if (name_dup == NULL || sname_dup == NULL) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509V3, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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if (name_dup != NULL)
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OPENSSL_free(name_dup);
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if (sname_dup != NULL)
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OPENSSL_free(sname_dup);
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if (idx == -1)
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OPENSSL_free(ptmp);
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return 0;
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}
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/* OPENSSL_free existing name if dynamic */
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if (ptmp->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME) {
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OPENSSL_free(ptmp->name);
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OPENSSL_free(ptmp->sname);
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}
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/* dup supplied name */
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ptmp->name = name_dup;
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ptmp->sname = sname_dup;
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/* Keep the dynamic flag of existing entry */
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ptmp->flags &= X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC;
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/* Set all other flags */
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ptmp->flags |= flags;
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ptmp->purpose = id;
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ptmp->trust = trust;
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ptmp->check_purpose = ck;
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ptmp->usr_data = arg;
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/* If its a new entry manage the dynamic table */
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if (idx == -1) {
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if (!xptable && !(xptable = sk_X509_PURPOSE_new(xp_cmp))) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509V3, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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xptable_free(ptmp);
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return 0;
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}
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if (!sk_X509_PURPOSE_push(xptable, ptmp)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509V3, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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xptable_free(ptmp);
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return 0;
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}
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}
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return 1;
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}
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static void xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE *p)
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{
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if (!p)
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return;
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if (p->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC) {
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if (p->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME) {
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OPENSSL_free(p->name);
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OPENSSL_free(p->sname);
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}
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OPENSSL_free(p);
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}
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}
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void X509_PURPOSE_cleanup(void)
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{
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unsigned int i;
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sk_X509_PURPOSE_pop_free(xptable, xptable_free);
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for (i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_COUNT; i++)
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xptable_free(xstandard + i);
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xptable = NULL;
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}
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int X509_PURPOSE_get_id(X509_PURPOSE *xp)
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{
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return xp->purpose;
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}
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char *X509_PURPOSE_get0_name(X509_PURPOSE *xp)
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{
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return xp->name;
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}
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char *X509_PURPOSE_get0_sname(X509_PURPOSE *xp)
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{
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return xp->sname;
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}
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int X509_PURPOSE_get_trust(X509_PURPOSE *xp)
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{
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return xp->trust;
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}
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static int nid_cmp(const void *void_a, const void *void_b)
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{
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const int *a = void_a, *b = void_b;
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return *a - *b;
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}
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int X509_supported_extension(X509_EXTENSION *ex)
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{
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/*
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* This table is a list of the NIDs of supported extensions: that is
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* those which are used by the verify process. If an extension is
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* critical and doesn't appear in this list then the verify process will
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* normally reject the certificate. The list must be kept in numerical
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* order because it will be searched using bsearch.
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*/
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static const int supported_nids[] = {
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NID_netscape_cert_type, /* 71 */
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NID_key_usage, /* 83 */
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NID_subject_alt_name, /* 85 */
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NID_basic_constraints, /* 87 */
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NID_certificate_policies, /* 89 */
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NID_ext_key_usage, /* 126 */
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NID_policy_constraints, /* 401 */
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NID_proxyCertInfo, /* 663 */
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NID_name_constraints, /* 666 */
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NID_policy_mappings, /* 747 */
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NID_inhibit_any_policy /* 748 */
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};
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int ex_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex));
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if (ex_nid == NID_undef)
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return 0;
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if (bsearch
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(&ex_nid, supported_nids, sizeof(supported_nids) / sizeof(int),
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sizeof(int), nid_cmp) != NULL)
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return 1;
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return 0;
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}
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static void setup_dp(X509 *x, DIST_POINT *dp)
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{
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X509_NAME *iname = NULL;
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size_t i;
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if (dp->reasons) {
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if (dp->reasons->length > 0)
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dp->dp_reasons = dp->reasons->data[0];
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if (dp->reasons->length > 1)
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dp->dp_reasons |= (dp->reasons->data[1] << 8);
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dp->dp_reasons &= CRLDP_ALL_REASONS;
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} else
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dp->dp_reasons = CRLDP_ALL_REASONS;
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if (!dp->distpoint || (dp->distpoint->type != 1))
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return;
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for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) {
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GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
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if (gen->type == GEN_DIRNAME) {
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iname = gen->d.directoryName;
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break;
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}
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}
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if (!iname)
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iname = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
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DIST_POINT_set_dpname(dp->distpoint, iname);
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}
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static void setup_crldp(X509 *x)
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{
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size_t i;
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x->crldp = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_crl_distribution_points, NULL, NULL);
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for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++)
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setup_dp(x, sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i));
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}
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static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x)
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{
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BASIC_CONSTRAINTS *bs;
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PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION *pci;
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ASN1_BIT_STRING *usage;
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ASN1_BIT_STRING *ns;
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EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE *extusage;
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X509_EXTENSION *ex;
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size_t i;
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int j;
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CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_read(&x->lock);
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const int is_set = x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET;
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CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_read(&x->lock);
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if (is_set) {
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return;
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}
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CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(&x->lock);
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if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET) {
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CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&x->lock);
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return;
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}
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X509_digest(x, EVP_sha1(), x->sha1_hash, NULL);
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/* V1 should mean no extensions ... */
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if (!X509_get_version(x))
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x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_V1;
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/* Handle basic constraints */
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if ((bs = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_basic_constraints, NULL, NULL))) {
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if (bs->ca)
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x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CA;
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if (bs->pathlen) {
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if ((bs->pathlen->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER)
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|| !bs->ca) {
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x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
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x->ex_pathlen = 0;
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} else
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x->ex_pathlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(bs->pathlen);
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} else
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x->ex_pathlen = -1;
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BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_free(bs);
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x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_BCONS;
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}
|
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/* Handle proxy certificates */
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if ((pci = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_proxyCertInfo, NULL, NULL))) {
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if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA
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|| X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_subject_alt_name, -1) >= 0
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|| X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_issuer_alt_name, -1) >= 0) {
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x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
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}
|
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if (pci->pcPathLengthConstraint) {
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x->ex_pcpathlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(pci->pcPathLengthConstraint);
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} else
|
|
x->ex_pcpathlen = -1;
|
|
PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION_free(pci);
|
|
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_PROXY;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Handle key usage */
|
|
if ((usage = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_key_usage, NULL, NULL))) {
|
|
if (usage->length > 0) {
|
|
x->ex_kusage = usage->data[0];
|
|
if (usage->length > 1)
|
|
x->ex_kusage |= usage->data[1] << 8;
|
|
} else
|
|
x->ex_kusage = 0;
|
|
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_KUSAGE;
|
|
ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(usage);
|
|
}
|
|
x->ex_xkusage = 0;
|
|
if ((extusage = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_ext_key_usage, NULL, NULL))) {
|
|
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_XKUSAGE;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(extusage); i++) {
|
|
switch (OBJ_obj2nid(sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(extusage, i))) {
|
|
case NID_server_auth:
|
|
x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SSL_SERVER;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case NID_client_auth:
|
|
x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SSL_CLIENT;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case NID_email_protect:
|
|
x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SMIME;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case NID_code_sign:
|
|
x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_CODE_SIGN;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case NID_ms_sgc:
|
|
case NID_ns_sgc:
|
|
x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SGC;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case NID_OCSP_sign:
|
|
x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_OCSP_SIGN;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case NID_time_stamp:
|
|
x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_TIMESTAMP;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case NID_dvcs:
|
|
x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_DVCS;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case NID_anyExtendedKeyUsage:
|
|
x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_ANYEKU;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(extusage, ASN1_OBJECT_free);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((ns = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_netscape_cert_type, NULL, NULL))) {
|
|
if (ns->length > 0)
|
|
x->ex_nscert = ns->data[0];
|
|
else
|
|
x->ex_nscert = 0;
|
|
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_NSCERT;
|
|
ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(ns);
|
|
}
|
|
x->skid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_key_identifier, NULL, NULL);
|
|
x->akid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_authority_key_identifier, NULL, NULL);
|
|
/* Does subject name match issuer ? */
|
|
if (!X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x), X509_get_issuer_name(x))) {
|
|
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SI;
|
|
/* If SKID matches AKID also indicate self signed */
|
|
if (X509_check_akid(x, x->akid) == X509_V_OK &&
|
|
!ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN))
|
|
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SS;
|
|
}
|
|
x->altname = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL);
|
|
x->nc = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_name_constraints, &j, NULL);
|
|
if (!x->nc && (j != -1))
|
|
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
|
|
setup_crldp(x);
|
|
|
|
for (j = 0; j < X509_get_ext_count(x); j++) {
|
|
ex = X509_get_ext(x, j);
|
|
if (OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex))
|
|
== NID_freshest_crl)
|
|
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_FRESHEST;
|
|
if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ex))
|
|
continue;
|
|
if (!X509_supported_extension(ex)) {
|
|
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CRITICAL;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SET;
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&x->lock);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* check_ca returns one if |x| should be considered a CA certificate and zero
|
|
* otherwise. */
|
|
static int check_ca(const X509 *x)
|
|
{
|
|
/* keyUsage if present should allow cert signing */
|
|
if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
/* Version 1 certificates are considered CAs and don't have extensions. */
|
|
if ((x->ex_flags & V1_ROOT) == V1_ROOT) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Otherwise, it's only a CA if basicConstraints says so. */
|
|
return ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS) &&
|
|
(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int X509_check_ca(X509 *x)
|
|
{
|
|
x509v3_cache_extensions(x);
|
|
return check_ca(x);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
|
|
int ca)
|
|
{
|
|
if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SSL_CLIENT))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
if (ca)
|
|
return check_ca(x);
|
|
/* We need to do digital signatures or key agreement */
|
|
if (ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | KU_KEY_AGREEMENT))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
/* nsCertType if present should allow SSL client use */
|
|
if (ns_reject(x, NS_SSL_CLIENT))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Key usage needed for TLS/SSL server: digital signature, encipherment or
|
|
* key agreement. The ssl code can check this more thoroughly for individual
|
|
* key types.
|
|
*/
|
|
#define KU_TLS \
|
|
(KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE|KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT|KU_KEY_AGREEMENT)
|
|
|
|
static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
|
|
int ca)
|
|
{
|
|
if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SSL_SERVER))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
if (ca)
|
|
return check_ca(x);
|
|
|
|
if (ns_reject(x, NS_SSL_SERVER))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
if (ku_reject(x, KU_TLS))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
|
|
int ca)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
ret = check_purpose_ssl_server(xp, x, ca);
|
|
if (!ret || ca)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
/* We need to encipher or Netscape complains */
|
|
if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* purpose_smime returns one if |x| is a valid S/MIME leaf (|ca| is zero) or CA
|
|
* (|ca| is one) certificate, and zero otherwise. */
|
|
static int purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int ca)
|
|
{
|
|
if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SMIME))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
if (ca) {
|
|
/* check nsCertType if present */
|
|
if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) &&
|
|
(x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME_CA) == 0) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return check_ca(x);
|
|
}
|
|
if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) {
|
|
return (x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME) == NS_SMIME;
|
|
}
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
|
|
int ca)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
ret = purpose_smime(x, ca);
|
|
if (!ret || ca)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
if (ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | KU_NON_REPUDIATION))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
|
|
int ca)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
ret = purpose_smime(x, ca);
|
|
if (!ret || ca)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
|
|
int ca)
|
|
{
|
|
if (ca) {
|
|
return check_ca(x);
|
|
}
|
|
if (ku_reject(x, KU_CRL_SIGN))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* OCSP helper: this is *not* a full OCSP check. It just checks that each CA
|
|
* is valid. Additional checks must be made on the chain.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
|
|
{
|
|
if (ca)
|
|
return check_ca(x);
|
|
/* leaf certificate is checked in OCSP_verify() */
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int check_purpose_timestamp_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
|
|
int ca)
|
|
{
|
|
int i_ext;
|
|
|
|
/* If ca is true we must return if this is a valid CA certificate. */
|
|
if (ca)
|
|
return check_ca(x);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Check the optional key usage field:
|
|
* if Key Usage is present, it must be one of digitalSignature
|
|
* and/or nonRepudiation (other values are not consistent and shall
|
|
* be rejected).
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE)
|
|
&& ((x->ex_kusage & ~(KU_NON_REPUDIATION | KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) ||
|
|
!(x->ex_kusage & (KU_NON_REPUDIATION | KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE))))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Only time stamp key usage is permitted and it's required. */
|
|
if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) || x->ex_xkusage != XKU_TIMESTAMP)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Extended Key Usage MUST be critical */
|
|
i_ext = X509_get_ext_by_NID((X509 *)x, NID_ext_key_usage, -1);
|
|
if (i_ext >= 0) {
|
|
X509_EXTENSION *ext = X509_get_ext((X509 *)x, i_ext);
|
|
if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ext))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
|
|
{
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Various checks to see if one certificate issued the second. This can be
|
|
* used to prune a set of possible issuer certificates which have been looked
|
|
* up using some simple method such as by subject name. These are: 1. Check
|
|
* issuer_name(subject) == subject_name(issuer) 2. If akid(subject) exists
|
|
* check it matches issuer 3. If key_usage(issuer) exists check it supports
|
|
* certificate signing returns 0 for OK, positive for reason for mismatch,
|
|
* reasons match codes for X509_verify_cert()
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int X509_check_issued(X509 *issuer, X509 *subject)
|
|
{
|
|
if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(issuer),
|
|
X509_get_issuer_name(subject)))
|
|
return X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH;
|
|
x509v3_cache_extensions(issuer);
|
|
x509v3_cache_extensions(subject);
|
|
|
|
if (subject->akid) {
|
|
int ret = X509_check_akid(issuer, subject->akid);
|
|
if (ret != X509_V_OK)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (subject->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
|
|
if (ku_reject(issuer, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE))
|
|
return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE;
|
|
} else if (ku_reject(issuer, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN))
|
|
return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CERTSIGN;
|
|
return X509_V_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int X509_check_akid(X509 *issuer, AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (!akid)
|
|
return X509_V_OK;
|
|
|
|
/* Check key ids (if present) */
|
|
if (akid->keyid && issuer->skid &&
|
|
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(akid->keyid, issuer->skid))
|
|
return X509_V_ERR_AKID_SKID_MISMATCH;
|
|
/* Check serial number */
|
|
if (akid->serial &&
|
|
ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(X509_get_serialNumber(issuer), akid->serial))
|
|
return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH;
|
|
/* Check issuer name */
|
|
if (akid->issuer) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Ugh, for some peculiar reason AKID includes SEQUENCE OF
|
|
* GeneralName. So look for a DirName. There may be more than one but
|
|
* we only take any notice of the first.
|
|
*/
|
|
GENERAL_NAMES *gens;
|
|
GENERAL_NAME *gen;
|
|
X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
gens = akid->issuer;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) {
|
|
gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
|
|
if (gen->type == GEN_DIRNAME) {
|
|
nm = gen->d.dirn;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (nm && X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_get_issuer_name(issuer)))
|
|
return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH;
|
|
}
|
|
return X509_V_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
uint32_t X509_get_extension_flags(X509 *x)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */
|
|
X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1);
|
|
return x->ex_flags;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
uint32_t X509_get_key_usage(X509 *x)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */
|
|
X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1);
|
|
if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE)
|
|
return x->ex_kusage;
|
|
return UINT32_MAX;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
uint32_t X509_get_extended_key_usage(X509 *x)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */
|
|
X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1);
|
|
if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE)
|
|
return x->ex_xkusage;
|
|
return UINT32_MAX;
|
|
}
|