4041 lines
121 KiB
C++
4041 lines
121 KiB
C++
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* This package is an SSL implementation written
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* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
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* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
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*
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* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
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* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
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* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
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* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
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* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
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* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
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* the code are not to be removed.
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* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
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* as the author of the parts of the library used.
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* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
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* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
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* must display the following acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
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* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
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* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
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* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
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* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
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* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
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* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
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* copied and put under another distribution licence
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* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
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*/
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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*
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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*
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
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* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
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* distribution.
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*
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
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* software must display the following acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
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* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
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* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
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* openssl-core@openssl.org.
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*
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* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
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* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
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* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
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*
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* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
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* acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
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* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
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* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
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* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
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* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
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* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
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* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
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* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
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* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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* ====================================================================
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*
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* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
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* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
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* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
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#include <openssl/ssl.h>
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#include <assert.h>
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#include <limits.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <utility>
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#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
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#include <openssl/chacha.h>
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#include <openssl/digest.h>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include <openssl/hmac.h>
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#include <openssl/mem.h>
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#include <openssl/nid.h>
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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#include "internal.h"
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#include "../crypto/internal.h"
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BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN
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static bool ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
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static int compare_uint16_t(const void *p1, const void *p2) {
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uint16_t u1 = *((const uint16_t *)p1);
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uint16_t u2 = *((const uint16_t *)p2);
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if (u1 < u2) {
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return -1;
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} else if (u1 > u2) {
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return 1;
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} else {
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return 0;
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}
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}
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// Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be
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// more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello.
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// This function does an initial scan over the extensions block to filter those
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// out.
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static bool tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const CBS *cbs) {
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// First pass: count the extensions.
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size_t num_extensions = 0;
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CBS extensions = *cbs;
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while (CBS_len(&extensions) > 0) {
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uint16_t type;
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CBS extension;
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if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &type) ||
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!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension)) {
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return false;
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}
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num_extensions++;
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}
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if (num_extensions == 0) {
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return true;
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}
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Array<uint16_t> extension_types;
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if (!extension_types.Init(num_extensions)) {
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return false;
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}
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// Second pass: gather the extension types.
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extensions = *cbs;
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for (size_t i = 0; i < extension_types.size(); i++) {
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CBS extension;
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if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &extension_types[i]) ||
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!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension)) {
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// This should not happen.
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return false;
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}
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}
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assert(CBS_len(&extensions) == 0);
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// Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates.
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qsort(extension_types.data(), extension_types.size(), sizeof(uint16_t),
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compare_uint16_t);
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for (size_t i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++) {
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if (extension_types[i - 1] == extension_types[i]) {
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return false;
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}
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}
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return true;
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}
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static bool is_post_quantum_group(uint16_t id) {
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return id == SSL_CURVE_CECPQ2 || id == SSL_CURVE_CECPQ2b;
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}
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bool ssl_client_hello_init(const SSL *ssl, SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *out,
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const SSLMessage &msg) {
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OPENSSL_memset(out, 0, sizeof(*out));
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out->ssl = const_cast<SSL *>(ssl);
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out->client_hello = CBS_data(&msg.body);
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out->client_hello_len = CBS_len(&msg.body);
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CBS client_hello, random, session_id;
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CBS_init(&client_hello, out->client_hello, out->client_hello_len);
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if (!CBS_get_u16(&client_hello, &out->version) ||
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!CBS_get_bytes(&client_hello, &random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
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!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &session_id) ||
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CBS_len(&session_id) > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
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return false;
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}
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out->random = CBS_data(&random);
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out->random_len = CBS_len(&random);
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out->session_id = CBS_data(&session_id);
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out->session_id_len = CBS_len(&session_id);
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// Skip past DTLS cookie
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if (SSL_is_dtls(out->ssl)) {
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CBS cookie;
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if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &cookie) ||
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CBS_len(&cookie) > DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH) {
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return false;
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}
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}
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CBS cipher_suites, compression_methods;
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if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &cipher_suites) ||
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CBS_len(&cipher_suites) < 2 || (CBS_len(&cipher_suites) & 1) != 0 ||
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!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &compression_methods) ||
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CBS_len(&compression_methods) < 1) {
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return false;
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}
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out->cipher_suites = CBS_data(&cipher_suites);
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out->cipher_suites_len = CBS_len(&cipher_suites);
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out->compression_methods = CBS_data(&compression_methods);
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out->compression_methods_len = CBS_len(&compression_methods);
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// If the ClientHello ends here then it's valid, but doesn't have any
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// extensions.
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if (CBS_len(&client_hello) == 0) {
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out->extensions = NULL;
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out->extensions_len = 0;
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return true;
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}
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// Extract extensions and check it is valid.
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CBS extensions;
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if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &extensions) ||
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!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions) ||
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CBS_len(&client_hello) != 0) {
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return false;
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}
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out->extensions = CBS_data(&extensions);
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out->extensions_len = CBS_len(&extensions);
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return true;
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}
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bool ssl_client_hello_get_extension(const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *client_hello,
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CBS *out, uint16_t extension_type) {
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CBS extensions;
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CBS_init(&extensions, client_hello->extensions, client_hello->extensions_len);
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while (CBS_len(&extensions) != 0) {
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// Decode the next extension.
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uint16_t type;
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CBS extension;
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if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &type) ||
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!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension)) {
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return false;
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}
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if (type == extension_type) {
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*out = extension;
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return true;
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}
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}
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return false;
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}
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static const uint16_t kDefaultGroups[] = {
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SSL_CURVE_X25519,
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SSL_CURVE_SECP256R1,
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SSL_CURVE_SECP384R1,
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};
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Span<const uint16_t> tls1_get_grouplist(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
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if (!hs->config->supported_group_list.empty()) {
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return hs->config->supported_group_list;
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}
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return Span<const uint16_t>(kDefaultGroups);
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}
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bool tls1_get_shared_group(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint16_t *out_group_id) {
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SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
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assert(ssl->server);
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// Clients are not required to send a supported_groups extension. In this
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// case, the server is free to pick any group it likes. See RFC 4492,
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// section 4, paragraph 3.
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//
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// However, in the interests of compatibility, we will skip ECDH if the
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// client didn't send an extension because we can't be sure that they'll
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// support our favoured group. Thus we do not special-case an emtpy
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// |peer_supported_group_list|.
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Span<const uint16_t> groups = tls1_get_grouplist(hs);
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Span<const uint16_t> pref, supp;
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if (ssl->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) {
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pref = groups;
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supp = hs->peer_supported_group_list;
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} else {
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pref = hs->peer_supported_group_list;
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supp = groups;
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}
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for (uint16_t pref_group : pref) {
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for (uint16_t supp_group : supp) {
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if (pref_group == supp_group &&
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// CECPQ2(b) doesn't fit in the u8-length-prefixed ECPoint field in
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// TLS 1.2 and below.
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(ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION ||
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!is_post_quantum_group(pref_group))) {
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*out_group_id = pref_group;
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return true;
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}
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}
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}
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return false;
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}
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bool tls1_set_curves(Array<uint16_t> *out_group_ids, Span<const int> curves) {
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Array<uint16_t> group_ids;
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if (!group_ids.Init(curves.size())) {
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return false;
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}
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for (size_t i = 0; i < curves.size(); i++) {
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if (!ssl_nid_to_group_id(&group_ids[i], curves[i])) {
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return false;
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}
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}
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*out_group_ids = std::move(group_ids);
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return true;
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}
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bool tls1_set_curves_list(Array<uint16_t> *out_group_ids, const char *curves) {
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// Count the number of curves in the list.
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size_t count = 0;
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const char *ptr = curves, *col;
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do {
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col = strchr(ptr, ':');
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count++;
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if (col) {
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ptr = col + 1;
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}
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} while (col);
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Array<uint16_t> group_ids;
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if (!group_ids.Init(count)) {
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return false;
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}
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size_t i = 0;
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ptr = curves;
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do {
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col = strchr(ptr, ':');
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if (!ssl_name_to_group_id(&group_ids[i++], ptr,
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col ? (size_t)(col - ptr) : strlen(ptr))) {
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return false;
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}
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if (col) {
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ptr = col + 1;
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}
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} while (col);
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assert(i == count);
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*out_group_ids = std::move(group_ids);
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return true;
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}
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bool tls1_check_group_id(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint16_t group_id) {
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if (is_post_quantum_group(group_id) &&
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ssl_protocol_version(hs->ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
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// CECPQ2(b) requires TLS 1.3.
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return false;
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}
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for (uint16_t supported : tls1_get_grouplist(hs)) {
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if (supported == group_id) {
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return true;
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}
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}
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return false;
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}
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// kVerifySignatureAlgorithms is the default list of accepted signature
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// algorithms for verifying.
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//
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// For now, RSA-PSS signature algorithms are not enabled on Android's system
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// BoringSSL. Once the change in Chrome has stuck and the values are finalized,
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// restore them.
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static const uint16_t kVerifySignatureAlgorithms[] = {
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// List our preferred algorithms first.
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SSL_SIGN_ED25519,
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SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256,
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SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256,
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SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256,
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// Larger hashes are acceptable.
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SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384,
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SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA384,
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SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384,
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SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA512,
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SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512,
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// For now, SHA-1 is still accepted but least preferable.
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SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1,
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};
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// kSignSignatureAlgorithms is the default list of supported signature
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// algorithms for signing.
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//
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// For now, RSA-PSS signature algorithms are not enabled on Android's system
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// BoringSSL. Once the change in Chrome has stuck and the values are finalized,
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// restore them.
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static const uint16_t kSignSignatureAlgorithms[] = {
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// List our preferred algorithms first.
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SSL_SIGN_ED25519,
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SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256,
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SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256,
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SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256,
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// If needed, sign larger hashes.
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//
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// TODO(davidben): Determine which of these may be pruned.
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SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384,
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SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA384,
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SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384,
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SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512,
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SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA512,
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SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512,
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// If the peer supports nothing else, sign with SHA-1.
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SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SHA1,
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SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1,
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};
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struct SSLSignatureAlgorithmList {
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bool Next(uint16_t *out) {
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while (!list.empty()) {
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uint16_t sigalg = list[0];
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list = list.subspan(1);
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if (skip_ed25519 && sigalg == SSL_SIGN_ED25519) {
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continue;
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}
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if (skip_rsa_pss_rsae && SSL_is_signature_algorithm_rsa_pss(sigalg)) {
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continue;
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}
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*out = sigalg;
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return true;
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}
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return false;
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}
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bool operator==(const SSLSignatureAlgorithmList &other) const {
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SSLSignatureAlgorithmList a = *this;
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SSLSignatureAlgorithmList b = other;
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uint16_t a_val, b_val;
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while (a.Next(&a_val)) {
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if (!b.Next(&b_val) ||
|
|
a_val != b_val) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return !b.Next(&b_val);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool operator!=(const SSLSignatureAlgorithmList &other) const {
|
|
return !(*this == other);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
Span<const uint16_t> list;
|
|
bool skip_ed25519 = false;
|
|
bool skip_rsa_pss_rsae = false;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static SSLSignatureAlgorithmList tls12_get_verify_sigalgs(const SSL *ssl,
|
|
bool for_certs) {
|
|
SSLSignatureAlgorithmList ret;
|
|
if (!ssl->config->verify_sigalgs.empty()) {
|
|
ret.list = ssl->config->verify_sigalgs;
|
|
} else {
|
|
ret.list = kVerifySignatureAlgorithms;
|
|
ret.skip_ed25519 = !ssl->ctx->ed25519_enabled;
|
|
}
|
|
if (for_certs) {
|
|
ret.skip_rsa_pss_rsae = !ssl->ctx->rsa_pss_rsae_certs_enabled;
|
|
}
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool tls12_add_verify_sigalgs(const SSL *ssl, CBB *out, bool for_certs) {
|
|
SSLSignatureAlgorithmList list = tls12_get_verify_sigalgs(ssl, for_certs);
|
|
uint16_t sigalg;
|
|
while (list.Next(&sigalg)) {
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16(out, sigalg)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
|
|
uint16_t sigalg) {
|
|
SSLSignatureAlgorithmList list = tls12_get_verify_sigalgs(ssl, false);
|
|
uint16_t verify_sigalg;
|
|
while (list.Next(&verify_sigalg)) {
|
|
if (verify_sigalg == sigalg) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool tls12_has_different_verify_sigalgs_for_certs(const SSL *ssl) {
|
|
return tls12_get_verify_sigalgs(ssl, true) !=
|
|
tls12_get_verify_sigalgs(ssl, false);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// tls_extension represents a TLS extension that is handled internally. The
|
|
// |init| function is called for each handshake, before any other functions of
|
|
// the extension. Then the add and parse callbacks are called as needed.
|
|
//
|
|
// The parse callbacks receive a |CBS| that contains the contents of the
|
|
// extension (i.e. not including the type and length bytes). If an extension is
|
|
// not received then the parse callbacks will be called with a NULL CBS so that
|
|
// they can do any processing needed to handle the absence of an extension.
|
|
//
|
|
// The add callbacks receive a |CBB| to which the extension can be appended but
|
|
// the function is responsible for appending the type and length bytes too.
|
|
//
|
|
// All callbacks return true for success and false for error. If a parse
|
|
// function returns zero then a fatal alert with value |*out_alert| will be
|
|
// sent. If |*out_alert| isn't set, then a |decode_error| alert will be sent.
|
|
struct tls_extension {
|
|
uint16_t value;
|
|
void (*init)(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
|
|
|
|
bool (*add_clienthello)(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out);
|
|
bool (*parse_serverhello)(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert,
|
|
CBS *contents);
|
|
|
|
bool (*parse_clienthello)(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert,
|
|
CBS *contents);
|
|
bool (*add_serverhello)(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out);
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static bool forbid_parse_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert,
|
|
CBS *contents) {
|
|
if (contents != NULL) {
|
|
// Servers MUST NOT send this extension.
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_EXTENSION);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool ignore_parse_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert,
|
|
CBS *contents) {
|
|
// This extension from the client is handled elsewhere.
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool dont_add_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Server name indication (SNI).
|
|
//
|
|
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6066#section-3.
|
|
|
|
static bool ext_sni_add_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
|
|
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
|
|
if (ssl->hostname == nullptr) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CBB contents, server_name_list, name;
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &server_name_list) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u8(&server_name_list, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&server_name_list, &name) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_bytes(&name, (const uint8_t *)ssl->hostname.get(),
|
|
strlen(ssl->hostname.get())) ||
|
|
!CBB_flush(out)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool ext_sni_parse_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert,
|
|
CBS *contents) {
|
|
// The server may acknowledge SNI with an empty extension. We check the syntax
|
|
// but otherwise ignore this signal.
|
|
return contents == NULL || CBS_len(contents) == 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool ext_sni_parse_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert,
|
|
CBS *contents) {
|
|
// SNI has already been parsed earlier in the handshake. See |extract_sni|.
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool ext_sni_add_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
|
|
if (hs->ssl->s3->session_reused ||
|
|
!hs->should_ack_sni) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16(out, 0 /* length */)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Renegotiation indication.
|
|
//
|
|
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5746
|
|
|
|
static bool ext_ri_add_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
|
|
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
|
|
// Renegotiation indication is not necessary in TLS 1.3.
|
|
if (hs->min_version >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
assert(ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete ==
|
|
(ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len != 0));
|
|
|
|
CBB contents, prev_finished;
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&contents, &prev_finished) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_bytes(&prev_finished, ssl->s3->previous_client_finished,
|
|
ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len) ||
|
|
!CBB_flush(out)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool ext_ri_parse_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert,
|
|
CBS *contents) {
|
|
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
|
|
if (contents != NULL && ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Servers may not switch between omitting the extension and supporting it.
|
|
// See RFC 5746, sections 3.5 and 4.2.
|
|
if (ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete &&
|
|
(contents != NULL) != ssl->s3->send_connection_binding) {
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (contents == NULL) {
|
|
// Strictly speaking, if we want to avoid an attack we should *always* see
|
|
// RI even on initial ServerHello because the client doesn't see any
|
|
// renegotiation during an attack. However this would mean we could not
|
|
// connect to any server which doesn't support RI.
|
|
//
|
|
// OpenSSL has |SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT| to control this, but in
|
|
// practical terms every client sets it so it's just assumed here.
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const size_t expected_len = ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len +
|
|
ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len;
|
|
|
|
// Check for logic errors
|
|
assert(!expected_len || ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len);
|
|
assert(!expected_len || ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len);
|
|
assert(ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete ==
|
|
(ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len != 0));
|
|
assert(ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete ==
|
|
(ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len != 0));
|
|
|
|
// Parse out the extension contents.
|
|
CBS renegotiated_connection;
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(contents, &renegotiated_connection) ||
|
|
CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check that the extension matches.
|
|
if (CBS_len(&renegotiated_connection) != expected_len) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const uint8_t *d = CBS_data(&renegotiated_connection);
|
|
bool ok = CRYPTO_memcmp(d, ssl->s3->previous_client_finished,
|
|
ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len) == 0;
|
|
#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
|
|
ok = true;
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (!ok) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
d += ssl->s3->previous_client_finished_len;
|
|
|
|
ok = CRYPTO_memcmp(d, ssl->s3->previous_server_finished,
|
|
ssl->s3->previous_server_finished_len) == 0;
|
|
#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
|
|
ok = true;
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (!ok) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
ssl->s3->send_connection_binding = true;
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool ext_ri_parse_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert,
|
|
CBS *contents) {
|
|
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
|
|
// Renegotiation isn't supported as a server so this function should never be
|
|
// called after the initial handshake.
|
|
assert(!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete);
|
|
|
|
if (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (contents == NULL) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CBS renegotiated_connection;
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(contents, &renegotiated_connection) ||
|
|
CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check that the extension matches. We do not support renegotiation as a
|
|
// server, so this must be empty.
|
|
if (CBS_len(&renegotiated_connection) != 0) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl->s3->send_connection_binding = true;
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool ext_ri_add_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
|
|
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
|
|
// Renegotiation isn't supported as a server so this function should never be
|
|
// called after the initial handshake.
|
|
assert(!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete);
|
|
|
|
if (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16(out, 1 /* length */) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u8(out, 0 /* empty renegotiation info */)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Extended Master Secret.
|
|
//
|
|
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7627
|
|
|
|
static bool ext_ems_add_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
|
|
// Extended master secret is not necessary in TLS 1.3.
|
|
if (hs->min_version >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16(out, 0 /* length */)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool ext_ems_parse_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert,
|
|
CBS *contents) {
|
|
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
|
|
|
|
if (contents != NULL) {
|
|
if (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION ||
|
|
CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
hs->extended_master_secret = true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Whether EMS is negotiated may not change on renegotiation.
|
|
if (ssl->s3->established_session != nullptr &&
|
|
hs->extended_master_secret !=
|
|
!!ssl->s3->established_session->extended_master_secret) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_EMS_MISMATCH);
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool ext_ems_parse_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert,
|
|
CBS *contents) {
|
|
if (ssl_protocol_version(hs->ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (contents == NULL) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
hs->extended_master_secret = true;
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool ext_ems_add_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
|
|
if (!hs->extended_master_secret) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16(out, 0 /* length */)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Session tickets.
|
|
//
|
|
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5077
|
|
|
|
static bool ext_ticket_add_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
|
|
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
|
|
// TLS 1.3 uses a different ticket extension.
|
|
if (hs->min_version >= TLS1_3_VERSION ||
|
|
SSL_get_options(ssl) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
Span<const uint8_t> ticket;
|
|
|
|
// Renegotiation does not participate in session resumption. However, still
|
|
// advertise the extension to avoid potentially breaking servers which carry
|
|
// over the state from the previous handshake, such as OpenSSL servers
|
|
// without upstream's 3c3f0259238594d77264a78944d409f2127642c4.
|
|
if (!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete &&
|
|
ssl->session != nullptr &&
|
|
!ssl->session->ticket.empty() &&
|
|
// Don't send TLS 1.3 session tickets in the ticket extension.
|
|
ssl_session_protocol_version(ssl->session.get()) < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
|
|
ticket = ssl->session->ticket;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CBB ticket_cbb;
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &ticket_cbb) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_bytes(&ticket_cbb, ticket.data(), ticket.size()) ||
|
|
!CBB_flush(out)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool ext_ticket_parse_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert,
|
|
CBS *contents) {
|
|
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
|
|
if (contents == NULL) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// If |SSL_OP_NO_TICKET| is set then no extension will have been sent and
|
|
// this function should never be called, even if the server tries to send the
|
|
// extension.
|
|
assert((SSL_get_options(ssl) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) == 0);
|
|
|
|
if (CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
hs->ticket_expected = true;
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool ext_ticket_add_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
|
|
if (!hs->ticket_expected) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// If |SSL_OP_NO_TICKET| is set, |ticket_expected| should never be true.
|
|
assert((SSL_get_options(hs->ssl) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) == 0);
|
|
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16(out, 0 /* length */)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Signature Algorithms.
|
|
//
|
|
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4.1
|
|
|
|
static bool ext_sigalgs_add_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
|
|
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
|
|
if (hs->max_version < TLS1_2_VERSION) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Prior to TLS 1.3, there was no way to signal different signature algorithm
|
|
// preferences between the online signature and certificates. If we do not
|
|
// send the signature_algorithms_cert extension, use the potentially more
|
|
// restrictive certificate list.
|
|
//
|
|
// TODO(davidben): When TLS 1.3 is finalized, we can likely remove the TLS 1.3
|
|
// check both here and in signature_algorithms_cert. |hs->max_version| is not
|
|
// the negotiated version. Rather the expectation is that any server consuming
|
|
// signature algorithms added in TLS 1.3 will also know to look at
|
|
// signature_algorithms_cert. For now, TLS 1.3 is not quite yet final and it
|
|
// seems prudent to condition this new extension on it.
|
|
bool for_certs = hs->max_version < TLS1_3_VERSION;
|
|
CBB contents, sigalgs_cbb;
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &sigalgs_cbb) ||
|
|
!tls12_add_verify_sigalgs(ssl, &sigalgs_cbb, for_certs) ||
|
|
!CBB_flush(out)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool ext_sigalgs_parse_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert,
|
|
CBS *contents) {
|
|
hs->peer_sigalgs.Reset();
|
|
if (contents == NULL) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CBS supported_signature_algorithms;
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(contents, &supported_signature_algorithms) ||
|
|
CBS_len(contents) != 0 ||
|
|
!tls1_parse_peer_sigalgs(hs, &supported_signature_algorithms)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Signature Algorithms for Certificates.
|
|
//
|
|
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#section-4.2.3
|
|
|
|
static bool ext_sigalgs_cert_add_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
|
|
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
|
|
// If this extension is omitted, it defaults to the signature_algorithms
|
|
// extension, so only emit it if the list is different.
|
|
//
|
|
// This extension is also new in TLS 1.3, so omit it if TLS 1.3 is disabled.
|
|
// There is a corresponding version check in |ext_sigalgs_add_clienthello|.
|
|
if (hs->max_version < TLS1_3_VERSION ||
|
|
!tls12_has_different_verify_sigalgs_for_certs(ssl)) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CBB contents, sigalgs_cbb;
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms_cert) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &sigalgs_cbb) ||
|
|
!tls12_add_verify_sigalgs(ssl, &sigalgs_cbb, true /* certs */) ||
|
|
!CBB_flush(out)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
// OCSP Stapling.
|
|
//
|
|
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6066#section-8
|
|
|
|
static bool ext_ocsp_add_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
|
|
if (!hs->config->ocsp_stapling_enabled) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CBB contents;
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u8(&contents, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16(&contents, 0 /* empty responder ID list */) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16(&contents, 0 /* empty request extensions */) ||
|
|
!CBB_flush(out)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool ext_ocsp_parse_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert,
|
|
CBS *contents) {
|
|
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
|
|
if (contents == NULL) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TLS 1.3 OCSP responses are included in the Certificate extensions.
|
|
if (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// OCSP stapling is forbidden on non-certificate ciphers.
|
|
if (CBS_len(contents) != 0 ||
|
|
!ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(hs->new_cipher)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Note this does not check for resumption in TLS 1.2. Sending
|
|
// status_request here does not make sense, but OpenSSL does so and the
|
|
// specification does not say anything. Tolerate it but ignore it.
|
|
|
|
hs->certificate_status_expected = true;
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool ext_ocsp_parse_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert,
|
|
CBS *contents) {
|
|
if (contents == NULL) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
uint8_t status_type;
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u8(contents, &status_type)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// We cannot decide whether OCSP stapling will occur yet because the correct
|
|
// SSL_CTX might not have been selected.
|
|
hs->ocsp_stapling_requested = status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool ext_ocsp_add_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
|
|
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
|
|
if (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION ||
|
|
!hs->ocsp_stapling_requested || hs->config->cert->ocsp_response == NULL ||
|
|
ssl->s3->session_reused ||
|
|
!ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(hs->new_cipher)) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
hs->certificate_status_expected = true;
|
|
|
|
return CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) &&
|
|
CBB_add_u16(out, 0 /* length */);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Next protocol negotiation.
|
|
//
|
|
// https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/agl/technotes/blob/master/nextprotoneg.html
|
|
|
|
static bool ext_npn_add_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
|
|
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
|
|
if (ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete ||
|
|
ssl->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL ||
|
|
SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16(out, 0 /* length */)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool ext_npn_parse_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert,
|
|
CBS *contents) {
|
|
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
|
|
if (contents == NULL) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// If any of these are false then we should never have sent the NPN
|
|
// extension in the ClientHello and thus this function should never have been
|
|
// called.
|
|
assert(!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete);
|
|
assert(!SSL_is_dtls(ssl));
|
|
assert(ssl->ctx->next_proto_select_cb != NULL);
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl->s3->alpn_selected.empty()) {
|
|
// NPN and ALPN may not be negotiated in the same connection.
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NEGOTIATED_BOTH_NPN_AND_ALPN);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const uint8_t *const orig_contents = CBS_data(contents);
|
|
const size_t orig_len = CBS_len(contents);
|
|
|
|
while (CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
|
|
CBS proto;
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(contents, &proto) ||
|
|
CBS_len(&proto) == 0) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
uint8_t *selected;
|
|
uint8_t selected_len;
|
|
if (ssl->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(
|
|
ssl, &selected, &selected_len, orig_contents, orig_len,
|
|
ssl->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK ||
|
|
!ssl->s3->next_proto_negotiated.CopyFrom(
|
|
MakeConstSpan(selected, selected_len))) {
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
hs->next_proto_neg_seen = true;
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool ext_npn_parse_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert,
|
|
CBS *contents) {
|
|
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
|
|
if (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (contents != NULL && CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (contents == NULL ||
|
|
ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete ||
|
|
ssl->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb == NULL ||
|
|
SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
hs->next_proto_neg_seen = true;
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool ext_npn_add_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
|
|
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
|
|
// |next_proto_neg_seen| might have been cleared when an ALPN extension was
|
|
// parsed.
|
|
if (!hs->next_proto_neg_seen) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const uint8_t *npa;
|
|
unsigned npa_len;
|
|
|
|
if (ssl->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(
|
|
ssl, &npa, &npa_len, ssl->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg) !=
|
|
SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
|
|
hs->next_proto_neg_seen = false;
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CBB contents;
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_bytes(&contents, npa, npa_len) ||
|
|
!CBB_flush(out)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Signed certificate timestamps.
|
|
//
|
|
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6962#section-3.3.1
|
|
|
|
static bool ext_sct_add_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
|
|
if (!hs->config->signed_cert_timestamps_enabled) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_certificate_timestamp) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16(out, 0 /* length */)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool ext_sct_parse_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert,
|
|
CBS *contents) {
|
|
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
|
|
if (contents == NULL) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TLS 1.3 SCTs are included in the Certificate extensions.
|
|
if (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// If this is false then we should never have sent the SCT extension in the
|
|
// ClientHello and thus this function should never have been called.
|
|
assert(hs->config->signed_cert_timestamps_enabled);
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl_is_sct_list_valid(contents)) {
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Session resumption uses the original session information. The extension
|
|
// should not be sent on resumption, but RFC 6962 did not make it a
|
|
// requirement, so tolerate this.
|
|
//
|
|
// TODO(davidben): Enforce this anyway.
|
|
if (!ssl->s3->session_reused) {
|
|
hs->new_session->signed_cert_timestamp_list.reset(
|
|
CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_from_CBS(contents, ssl->ctx->pool));
|
|
if (hs->new_session->signed_cert_timestamp_list == nullptr) {
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool ext_sct_parse_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert,
|
|
CBS *contents) {
|
|
if (contents == NULL) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
hs->scts_requested = true;
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool ext_sct_add_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
|
|
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
|
|
// The extension shouldn't be sent when resuming sessions.
|
|
if (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION || ssl->s3->session_reused ||
|
|
hs->config->cert->signed_cert_timestamp_list == NULL) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CBB contents;
|
|
return CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_certificate_timestamp) &&
|
|
CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) &&
|
|
CBB_add_bytes(
|
|
&contents,
|
|
CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(
|
|
hs->config->cert->signed_cert_timestamp_list.get()),
|
|
CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(
|
|
hs->config->cert->signed_cert_timestamp_list.get())) &&
|
|
CBB_flush(out);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Application-level Protocol Negotiation.
|
|
//
|
|
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7301
|
|
|
|
static bool ext_alpn_add_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
|
|
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
|
|
if (hs->config->alpn_client_proto_list.empty() ||
|
|
ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CBB contents, proto_list;
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &proto_list) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_bytes(&proto_list, hs->config->alpn_client_proto_list.data(),
|
|
hs->config->alpn_client_proto_list.size()) ||
|
|
!CBB_flush(out)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool ext_alpn_parse_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert,
|
|
CBS *contents) {
|
|
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
|
|
if (contents == NULL) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
assert(!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete);
|
|
assert(!hs->config->alpn_client_proto_list.empty());
|
|
|
|
if (hs->next_proto_neg_seen) {
|
|
// NPN and ALPN may not be negotiated in the same connection.
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NEGOTIATED_BOTH_NPN_AND_ALPN);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// The extension data consists of a ProtocolNameList which must have
|
|
// exactly one ProtocolName. Each of these is length-prefixed.
|
|
CBS protocol_name_list, protocol_name;
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(contents, &protocol_name_list) ||
|
|
CBS_len(contents) != 0 ||
|
|
!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&protocol_name_list, &protocol_name) ||
|
|
// Empty protocol names are forbidden.
|
|
CBS_len(&protocol_name) == 0 ||
|
|
CBS_len(&protocol_name_list) != 0) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl_is_alpn_protocol_allowed(hs, protocol_name)) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_ALPN_PROTOCOL);
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl->s3->alpn_selected.CopyFrom(protocol_name)) {
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool ssl_is_alpn_protocol_allowed(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
|
|
Span<const uint8_t> protocol) {
|
|
if (hs->config->alpn_client_proto_list.empty()) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (hs->ssl->ctx->allow_unknown_alpn_protos) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check that the protocol name is one of the ones we advertised.
|
|
CBS client_protocol_name_list =
|
|
MakeConstSpan(hs->config->alpn_client_proto_list),
|
|
client_protocol_name;
|
|
while (CBS_len(&client_protocol_name_list) > 0) {
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_protocol_name_list,
|
|
&client_protocol_name)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (client_protocol_name == protocol) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool ssl_negotiate_alpn(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert,
|
|
const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *client_hello) {
|
|
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
|
|
CBS contents;
|
|
if (ssl->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL ||
|
|
!ssl_client_hello_get_extension(
|
|
client_hello, &contents,
|
|
TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)) {
|
|
// Ignore ALPN if not configured or no extension was supplied.
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ALPN takes precedence over NPN.
|
|
hs->next_proto_neg_seen = false;
|
|
|
|
CBS protocol_name_list;
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &protocol_name_list) ||
|
|
CBS_len(&contents) != 0 ||
|
|
CBS_len(&protocol_name_list) < 2) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Validate the protocol list.
|
|
CBS protocol_name_list_copy = protocol_name_list;
|
|
while (CBS_len(&protocol_name_list_copy) > 0) {
|
|
CBS protocol_name;
|
|
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&protocol_name_list_copy, &protocol_name) ||
|
|
// Empty protocol names are forbidden.
|
|
CBS_len(&protocol_name) == 0) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const uint8_t *selected;
|
|
uint8_t selected_len;
|
|
if (ssl->ctx->alpn_select_cb(
|
|
ssl, &selected, &selected_len, CBS_data(&protocol_name_list),
|
|
CBS_len(&protocol_name_list),
|
|
ssl->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg) == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
|
|
if (selected_len == 0) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_ALPN_PROTOCOL);
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!ssl->s3->alpn_selected.CopyFrom(
|
|
MakeConstSpan(selected, selected_len))) {
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool ext_alpn_add_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
|
|
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
|
|
if (ssl->s3->alpn_selected.empty()) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CBB contents, proto_list, proto;
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &proto_list) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&proto_list, &proto) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_bytes(&proto, ssl->s3->alpn_selected.data(),
|
|
ssl->s3->alpn_selected.size()) ||
|
|
!CBB_flush(out)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Channel ID.
|
|
//
|
|
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-balfanz-tls-channelid-01
|
|
|
|
static void ext_channel_id_init(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
|
|
hs->ssl->s3->channel_id_valid = false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool ext_channel_id_add_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
|
|
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
|
|
if (!hs->config->channel_id_enabled || SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16(out, 0 /* length */)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool ext_channel_id_parse_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
|
|
uint8_t *out_alert,
|
|
CBS *contents) {
|
|
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
|
|
if (contents == NULL) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
assert(!SSL_is_dtls(ssl));
|
|
assert(hs->config->channel_id_enabled);
|
|
|
|
if (CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl->s3->channel_id_valid = true;
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool ext_channel_id_parse_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
|
|
uint8_t *out_alert,
|
|
CBS *contents) {
|
|
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
|
|
if (contents == NULL || !hs->config->channel_id_enabled || SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl->s3->channel_id_valid = true;
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool ext_channel_id_add_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
|
|
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
|
|
if (!ssl->s3->channel_id_valid) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16(out, 0 /* length */)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) extension.
|
|
//
|
|
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5764
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void ext_srtp_init(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
|
|
hs->ssl->s3->srtp_profile = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool ext_srtp_add_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
|
|
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
|
|
STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *profiles = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(ssl);
|
|
if (profiles == NULL ||
|
|
sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(profiles) == 0) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CBB contents, profile_ids;
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_srtp) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &profile_ids)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (const SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *profile : profiles) {
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16(&profile_ids, profile->id)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u8(&contents, 0 /* empty use_mki value */) ||
|
|
!CBB_flush(out)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool ext_srtp_parse_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert,
|
|
CBS *contents) {
|
|
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
|
|
if (contents == NULL) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// The extension consists of a u16-prefixed profile ID list containing a
|
|
// single uint16_t profile ID, then followed by a u8-prefixed srtp_mki field.
|
|
//
|
|
// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5764#section-4.1.1
|
|
CBS profile_ids, srtp_mki;
|
|
uint16_t profile_id;
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(contents, &profile_ids) ||
|
|
!CBS_get_u16(&profile_ids, &profile_id) ||
|
|
CBS_len(&profile_ids) != 0 ||
|
|
!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(contents, &srtp_mki) ||
|
|
CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (CBS_len(&srtp_mki) != 0) {
|
|
// Must be no MKI, since we never offer one.
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE);
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *profiles = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(ssl);
|
|
|
|
// Check to see if the server gave us something we support (and presumably
|
|
// offered).
|
|
for (const SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *profile : profiles) {
|
|
if (profile->id == profile_id) {
|
|
ssl->s3->srtp_profile = profile;
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool ext_srtp_parse_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert,
|
|
CBS *contents) {
|
|
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
|
|
if (contents == NULL) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CBS profile_ids, srtp_mki;
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(contents, &profile_ids) ||
|
|
CBS_len(&profile_ids) < 2 ||
|
|
!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(contents, &srtp_mki) ||
|
|
CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
// Discard the MKI value for now.
|
|
|
|
const STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *server_profiles =
|
|
SSL_get_srtp_profiles(ssl);
|
|
|
|
// Pick the server's most preferred profile.
|
|
for (const SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *server_profile : server_profiles) {
|
|
CBS profile_ids_tmp;
|
|
CBS_init(&profile_ids_tmp, CBS_data(&profile_ids), CBS_len(&profile_ids));
|
|
|
|
while (CBS_len(&profile_ids_tmp) > 0) {
|
|
uint16_t profile_id;
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u16(&profile_ids_tmp, &profile_id)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (server_profile->id == profile_id) {
|
|
ssl->s3->srtp_profile = server_profile;
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool ext_srtp_add_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
|
|
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
|
|
if (ssl->s3->srtp_profile == NULL) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CBB contents, profile_ids;
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_srtp) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &profile_ids) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16(&profile_ids, ssl->s3->srtp_profile->id) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u8(&contents, 0 /* empty MKI */) ||
|
|
!CBB_flush(out)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
// EC point formats.
|
|
//
|
|
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4492#section-5.1.2
|
|
|
|
static bool ext_ec_point_add_extension(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
|
|
CBB contents, formats;
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&contents, &formats) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u8(&formats, TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) ||
|
|
!CBB_flush(out)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool ext_ec_point_add_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
|
|
// The point format extension is unnecessary in TLS 1.3.
|
|
if (hs->min_version >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ext_ec_point_add_extension(hs, out);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool ext_ec_point_parse_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert,
|
|
CBS *contents) {
|
|
if (contents == NULL) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ssl_protocol_version(hs->ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CBS ec_point_format_list;
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(contents, &ec_point_format_list) ||
|
|
CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Per RFC 4492, section 5.1.2, implementations MUST support the uncompressed
|
|
// point format.
|
|
if (OPENSSL_memchr(CBS_data(&ec_point_format_list),
|
|
TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
|
|
CBS_len(&ec_point_format_list)) == NULL) {
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool ext_ec_point_parse_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert,
|
|
CBS *contents) {
|
|
if (ssl_protocol_version(hs->ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ext_ec_point_parse_serverhello(hs, out_alert, contents);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool ext_ec_point_add_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
|
|
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
|
|
if (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const uint32_t alg_k = hs->new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
|
|
const uint32_t alg_a = hs->new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
|
|
const bool using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
|
|
|
|
if (!using_ecc) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ext_ec_point_add_extension(hs, out);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Pre Shared Key
|
|
//
|
|
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#section-4.2.11
|
|
|
|
static size_t ext_pre_shared_key_clienthello_length(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
|
|
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
|
|
if (hs->max_version < TLS1_3_VERSION || ssl->session == nullptr ||
|
|
ssl_session_protocol_version(ssl->session.get()) < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
size_t binder_len = EVP_MD_size(ssl_session_get_digest(ssl->session.get()));
|
|
return 15 + ssl->session->ticket.size() + binder_len;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool ext_pre_shared_key_add_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
|
|
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
|
|
hs->needs_psk_binder = false;
|
|
if (hs->max_version < TLS1_3_VERSION || ssl->session == nullptr ||
|
|
ssl_session_protocol_version(ssl->session.get()) < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Per RFC 8446 section 4.1.4, skip offering the session if the selected
|
|
// cipher in HelloRetryRequest does not match. This avoids performing the
|
|
// transcript hash transformation for multiple hashes.
|
|
if (hs->received_hello_retry_request &&
|
|
ssl->session->cipher->algorithm_prf != hs->new_cipher->algorithm_prf) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
struct OPENSSL_timeval now;
|
|
ssl_get_current_time(ssl, &now);
|
|
uint32_t ticket_age = 1000 * (now.tv_sec - ssl->session->time);
|
|
uint32_t obfuscated_ticket_age = ticket_age + ssl->session->ticket_age_add;
|
|
|
|
// Fill in a placeholder zero binder of the appropriate length. It will be
|
|
// computed and filled in later after length prefixes are computed.
|
|
uint8_t zero_binder[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE] = {0};
|
|
size_t binder_len = EVP_MD_size(ssl_session_get_digest(ssl->session.get()));
|
|
|
|
CBB contents, identity, ticket, binders, binder;
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_pre_shared_key) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &identity) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&identity, &ticket) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_bytes(&ticket, ssl->session->ticket.data(),
|
|
ssl->session->ticket.size()) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u32(&identity, obfuscated_ticket_age) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &binders) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&binders, &binder) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_bytes(&binder, zero_binder, binder_len)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
hs->needs_psk_binder = true;
|
|
return CBB_flush(out);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool ssl_ext_pre_shared_key_parse_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
|
|
uint8_t *out_alert,
|
|
CBS *contents) {
|
|
uint16_t psk_id;
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u16(contents, &psk_id) ||
|
|
CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// We only advertise one PSK identity, so the only legal index is zero.
|
|
if (psk_id != 0) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool ssl_ext_pre_shared_key_parse_clienthello(
|
|
SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBS *out_ticket, CBS *out_binders,
|
|
uint32_t *out_obfuscated_ticket_age, uint8_t *out_alert,
|
|
const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *client_hello, CBS *contents) {
|
|
// Verify that the pre_shared_key extension is the last extension in
|
|
// ClientHello.
|
|
if (CBS_data(contents) + CBS_len(contents) !=
|
|
client_hello->extensions + client_hello->extensions_len) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PRE_SHARED_KEY_MUST_BE_LAST);
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// We only process the first PSK identity since we don't support pure PSK.
|
|
CBS identities, binders;
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(contents, &identities) ||
|
|
!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&identities, out_ticket) ||
|
|
!CBS_get_u32(&identities, out_obfuscated_ticket_age) ||
|
|
!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(contents, &binders) ||
|
|
CBS_len(&binders) == 0 ||
|
|
CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*out_binders = binders;
|
|
|
|
// Check the syntax of the remaining identities, but do not process them.
|
|
size_t num_identities = 1;
|
|
while (CBS_len(&identities) != 0) {
|
|
CBS unused_ticket;
|
|
uint32_t unused_obfuscated_ticket_age;
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&identities, &unused_ticket) ||
|
|
!CBS_get_u32(&identities, &unused_obfuscated_ticket_age)) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
num_identities++;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check the syntax of the binders. The value will be checked later if
|
|
// resuming.
|
|
size_t num_binders = 0;
|
|
while (CBS_len(&binders) != 0) {
|
|
CBS binder;
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&binders, &binder)) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
num_binders++;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (num_identities != num_binders) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_BINDER_COUNT_MISMATCH);
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool ssl_ext_pre_shared_key_add_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
|
|
if (!hs->ssl->s3->session_reused) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CBB contents;
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_pre_shared_key) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
|
|
// We only consider the first identity for resumption
|
|
!CBB_add_u16(&contents, 0) ||
|
|
!CBB_flush(out)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Pre-Shared Key Exchange Modes
|
|
//
|
|
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#section-4.2.9
|
|
|
|
static bool ext_psk_key_exchange_modes_add_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
|
|
CBB *out) {
|
|
if (hs->max_version < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CBB contents, ke_modes;
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk_key_exchange_modes) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&contents, &ke_modes) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u8(&ke_modes, SSL_PSK_DHE_KE)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return CBB_flush(out);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool ext_psk_key_exchange_modes_parse_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
|
|
uint8_t *out_alert,
|
|
CBS *contents) {
|
|
if (contents == NULL) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CBS ke_modes;
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(contents, &ke_modes) ||
|
|
CBS_len(&ke_modes) == 0 ||
|
|
CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// We only support tickets with PSK_DHE_KE.
|
|
hs->accept_psk_mode = OPENSSL_memchr(CBS_data(&ke_modes), SSL_PSK_DHE_KE,
|
|
CBS_len(&ke_modes)) != NULL;
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Early Data Indication
|
|
//
|
|
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#section-4.2.10
|
|
|
|
static bool ext_early_data_add_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
|
|
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
|
|
// The second ClientHello never offers early data, and we must have already
|
|
// filled in |early_data_reason| by this point.
|
|
if (hs->received_hello_retry_request) {
|
|
assert(ssl->s3->early_data_reason != ssl_early_data_unknown);
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl->enable_early_data) {
|
|
ssl->s3->early_data_reason = ssl_early_data_disabled;
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (hs->max_version < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
|
|
// We discard inapplicable sessions, so this is redundant with the session
|
|
// checks below, but we check give a more useful reason.
|
|
ssl->s3->early_data_reason = ssl_early_data_protocol_version;
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ssl->session == nullptr) {
|
|
ssl->s3->early_data_reason = ssl_early_data_no_session_offered;
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ssl_session_protocol_version(ssl->session.get()) < TLS1_3_VERSION ||
|
|
ssl->session->ticket_max_early_data == 0) {
|
|
ssl->s3->early_data_reason = ssl_early_data_unsupported_for_session;
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// In case ALPN preferences changed since this session was established, avoid
|
|
// reporting a confusing value in |SSL_get0_alpn_selected| and sending early
|
|
// data we know will be rejected.
|
|
if (!ssl->session->early_alpn.empty() &&
|
|
!ssl_is_alpn_protocol_allowed(hs, ssl->session->early_alpn)) {
|
|
ssl->s3->early_data_reason = ssl_early_data_alpn_mismatch;
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// |early_data_reason| will be filled in later when the server responds.
|
|
hs->early_data_offered = true;
|
|
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16(out, 0) ||
|
|
!CBB_flush(out)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool ext_early_data_parse_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
|
|
uint8_t *out_alert,
|
|
CBS *contents) {
|
|
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
|
|
if (contents == NULL) {
|
|
if (hs->early_data_offered && !hs->received_hello_retry_request) {
|
|
ssl->s3->early_data_reason = ssl->s3->session_reused
|
|
? ssl_early_data_peer_declined
|
|
: ssl_early_data_session_not_resumed;
|
|
} else {
|
|
// We already filled in |early_data_reason| when declining to offer 0-RTT
|
|
// or handling the implicit HelloRetryRequest reject.
|
|
assert(ssl->s3->early_data_reason != ssl_early_data_unknown);
|
|
}
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// If we received an HRR, the second ClientHello never offers early data, so
|
|
// the extensions logic will automatically reject early data extensions as
|
|
// unsolicited. This covered by the ServerAcceptsEarlyDataOnHRR test.
|
|
assert(!hs->received_hello_retry_request);
|
|
|
|
if (CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl->s3->session_reused) {
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_EXTENSION);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl->s3->early_data_reason = ssl_early_data_accepted;
|
|
ssl->s3->early_data_accepted = true;
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool ext_early_data_parse_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
|
|
uint8_t *out_alert, CBS *contents) {
|
|
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
|
|
if (contents == NULL ||
|
|
ssl_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
hs->early_data_offered = true;
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool ext_early_data_add_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
|
|
if (!hs->ssl->s3->early_data_accepted) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16(out, 0) ||
|
|
!CBB_flush(out)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Key Share
|
|
//
|
|
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#section-4.2.8
|
|
|
|
static bool ext_key_share_add_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
|
|
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
|
|
if (hs->max_version < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CBB contents, kse_bytes;
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &kse_bytes)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
uint16_t group_id = hs->retry_group;
|
|
uint16_t second_group_id = 0;
|
|
if (hs->received_hello_retry_request) {
|
|
// We received a HelloRetryRequest without a new curve, so there is no new
|
|
// share to append. Leave |hs->key_share| as-is.
|
|
if (group_id == 0 &&
|
|
!CBB_add_bytes(&kse_bytes, hs->key_share_bytes.data(),
|
|
hs->key_share_bytes.size())) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
hs->key_share_bytes.Reset();
|
|
if (group_id == 0) {
|
|
return CBB_flush(out);
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
// Add a fake group. See draft-davidben-tls-grease-01.
|
|
if (ssl->ctx->grease_enabled &&
|
|
(!CBB_add_u16(&kse_bytes,
|
|
ssl_get_grease_value(hs, ssl_grease_group)) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16(&kse_bytes, 1 /* length */) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u8(&kse_bytes, 0 /* one byte key share */))) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Predict the most preferred group.
|
|
Span<const uint16_t> groups = tls1_get_grouplist(hs);
|
|
if (groups.empty()) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_GROUPS_SPECIFIED);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
group_id = groups[0];
|
|
|
|
if (is_post_quantum_group(group_id) && groups.size() >= 2) {
|
|
// CECPQ2(b) is not sent as the only initial key share. We'll include the
|
|
// 2nd preference group too to avoid round-trips.
|
|
second_group_id = groups[1];
|
|
assert(second_group_id != group_id);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CBB key_exchange;
|
|
hs->key_shares[0] = SSLKeyShare::Create(group_id);
|
|
if (!hs->key_shares[0] ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16(&kse_bytes, group_id) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&kse_bytes, &key_exchange) ||
|
|
!hs->key_shares[0]->Offer(&key_exchange) ||
|
|
!CBB_flush(&kse_bytes)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (second_group_id != 0) {
|
|
hs->key_shares[1] = SSLKeyShare::Create(second_group_id);
|
|
if (!hs->key_shares[1] ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16(&kse_bytes, second_group_id) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&kse_bytes, &key_exchange) ||
|
|
!hs->key_shares[1]->Offer(&key_exchange) ||
|
|
!CBB_flush(&kse_bytes)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Save the contents of the extension to repeat it in the second
|
|
// ClientHello.
|
|
if (!hs->received_hello_retry_request &&
|
|
!hs->key_share_bytes.CopyFrom(
|
|
MakeConstSpan(CBB_data(&kse_bytes), CBB_len(&kse_bytes)))) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return CBB_flush(out);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool ssl_ext_key_share_parse_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
|
|
Array<uint8_t> *out_secret,
|
|
uint8_t *out_alert, CBS *contents) {
|
|
CBS peer_key;
|
|
uint16_t group_id;
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u16(contents, &group_id) ||
|
|
!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(contents, &peer_key) ||
|
|
CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SSLKeyShare *key_share = hs->key_shares[0].get();
|
|
if (key_share->GroupID() != group_id) {
|
|
if (!hs->key_shares[1] || hs->key_shares[1]->GroupID() != group_id) {
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
key_share = hs->key_shares[1].get();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!key_share->Finish(out_secret, out_alert, peer_key)) {
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
hs->new_session->group_id = group_id;
|
|
hs->key_shares[0].reset();
|
|
hs->key_shares[1].reset();
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool ssl_ext_key_share_parse_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, bool *out_found,
|
|
Array<uint8_t> *out_secret,
|
|
uint8_t *out_alert, CBS *contents) {
|
|
uint16_t group_id;
|
|
CBS key_shares;
|
|
if (!tls1_get_shared_group(hs, &group_id)) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_GROUP);
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(contents, &key_shares) ||
|
|
CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Find the corresponding key share.
|
|
CBS peer_key;
|
|
CBS_init(&peer_key, NULL, 0);
|
|
while (CBS_len(&key_shares) > 0) {
|
|
uint16_t id;
|
|
CBS peer_key_tmp;
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u16(&key_shares, &id) ||
|
|
!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&key_shares, &peer_key_tmp) ||
|
|
CBS_len(&peer_key_tmp) == 0) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (id == group_id) {
|
|
if (CBS_len(&peer_key) != 0) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DUPLICATE_KEY_SHARE);
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
peer_key = peer_key_tmp;
|
|
// Continue parsing the structure to keep peers honest.
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (CBS_len(&peer_key) == 0) {
|
|
*out_found = false;
|
|
out_secret->Reset();
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Compute the DH secret.
|
|
Array<uint8_t> secret;
|
|
ScopedCBB public_key;
|
|
UniquePtr<SSLKeyShare> key_share = SSLKeyShare::Create(group_id);
|
|
if (!key_share ||
|
|
!CBB_init(public_key.get(), 32) ||
|
|
!key_share->Accept(public_key.get(), &secret, out_alert, peer_key) ||
|
|
!CBBFinishArray(public_key.get(), &hs->ecdh_public_key)) {
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*out_secret = std::move(secret);
|
|
*out_found = true;
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool ssl_ext_key_share_add_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
|
|
uint16_t group_id;
|
|
CBB kse_bytes, public_key;
|
|
if (!tls1_get_shared_group(hs, &group_id) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &kse_bytes) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16(&kse_bytes, group_id) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&kse_bytes, &public_key) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_bytes(&public_key, hs->ecdh_public_key.data(),
|
|
hs->ecdh_public_key.size()) ||
|
|
!CBB_flush(out)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
hs->ecdh_public_key.Reset();
|
|
|
|
hs->new_session->group_id = group_id;
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Supported Versions
|
|
//
|
|
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#section-4.2.1
|
|
|
|
static bool ext_supported_versions_add_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
|
|
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
|
|
if (hs->max_version <= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CBB contents, versions;
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&contents, &versions)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Add a fake version. See draft-davidben-tls-grease-01.
|
|
if (ssl->ctx->grease_enabled &&
|
|
!CBB_add_u16(&versions, ssl_get_grease_value(hs, ssl_grease_version))) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl_add_supported_versions(hs, &versions) ||
|
|
!CBB_flush(out)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Cookie
|
|
//
|
|
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#section-4.2.2
|
|
|
|
static bool ext_cookie_add_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
|
|
if (hs->cookie.empty()) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CBB contents, cookie;
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &cookie) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_bytes(&cookie, hs->cookie.data(), hs->cookie.size()) ||
|
|
!CBB_flush(out)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// The cookie is no longer needed in memory.
|
|
hs->cookie.Reset();
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Supported Groups
|
|
//
|
|
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4492#section-5.1.1
|
|
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#section-4.2.7
|
|
|
|
static bool ext_supported_groups_add_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
|
|
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
|
|
CBB contents, groups_bytes;
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &groups_bytes)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Add a fake group. See draft-davidben-tls-grease-01.
|
|
if (ssl->ctx->grease_enabled &&
|
|
!CBB_add_u16(&groups_bytes,
|
|
ssl_get_grease_value(hs, ssl_grease_group))) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (uint16_t group : tls1_get_grouplist(hs)) {
|
|
if (is_post_quantum_group(group) &&
|
|
hs->max_version < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16(&groups_bytes, group)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return CBB_flush(out);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool ext_supported_groups_parse_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
|
|
uint8_t *out_alert,
|
|
CBS *contents) {
|
|
// This extension is not expected to be echoed by servers in TLS 1.2, but some
|
|
// BigIP servers send it nonetheless, so do not enforce this.
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool parse_u16_array(const CBS *cbs, Array<uint16_t> *out) {
|
|
CBS copy = *cbs;
|
|
if ((CBS_len(©) & 1) != 0) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
Array<uint16_t> ret;
|
|
if (!ret.Init(CBS_len(©) / 2)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < ret.size(); i++) {
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u16(©, &ret[i])) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
assert(CBS_len(©) == 0);
|
|
*out = std::move(ret);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool ext_supported_groups_parse_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
|
|
uint8_t *out_alert,
|
|
CBS *contents) {
|
|
if (contents == NULL) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CBS supported_group_list;
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(contents, &supported_group_list) ||
|
|
CBS_len(&supported_group_list) == 0 ||
|
|
CBS_len(contents) != 0 ||
|
|
!parse_u16_array(&supported_group_list, &hs->peer_supported_group_list)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Token Binding
|
|
//
|
|
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tokbind-negotiation-10
|
|
|
|
// The Token Binding version number currently matches the draft number of
|
|
// draft-ietf-tokbind-protocol, and when published as an RFC it will be 0x0100.
|
|
// Since there are no wire changes to the protocol from draft 13 through the
|
|
// current draft (16), this implementation supports all versions in that range.
|
|
static uint16_t kTokenBindingMaxVersion = 16;
|
|
static uint16_t kTokenBindingMinVersion = 13;
|
|
|
|
static bool ext_token_binding_add_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
|
|
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
|
|
if (hs->config->token_binding_params.empty() || SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CBB contents, params;
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_token_binding) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16(&contents, kTokenBindingMaxVersion) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&contents, ¶ms) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_bytes(¶ms, hs->config->token_binding_params.data(),
|
|
hs->config->token_binding_params.size()) ||
|
|
!CBB_flush(out)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool ext_token_binding_parse_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
|
|
uint8_t *out_alert,
|
|
CBS *contents) {
|
|
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
|
|
if (contents == nullptr) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CBS params_list;
|
|
uint16_t version;
|
|
uint8_t param;
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u16(contents, &version) ||
|
|
!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(contents, ¶ms_list) ||
|
|
!CBS_get_u8(¶ms_list, ¶m) ||
|
|
CBS_len(¶ms_list) > 0 ||
|
|
CBS_len(contents) > 0) {
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// The server-negotiated version must be less than or equal to our version.
|
|
if (version > kTokenBindingMaxVersion) {
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// If the server-selected version is less than what we support, then Token
|
|
// Binding wasn't negotiated (but the extension was parsed successfully).
|
|
if (version < kTokenBindingMinVersion) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (uint8_t config_param : hs->config->token_binding_params) {
|
|
if (param == config_param) {
|
|
ssl->s3->negotiated_token_binding_param = param;
|
|
ssl->s3->token_binding_negotiated = true;
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// select_tb_param looks for the first token binding param in
|
|
// |hs->ssl->token_binding_params| that is also in |params| and puts it in
|
|
// |hs->ssl->negotiated_token_binding_param|. It returns true if a token binding
|
|
// param is found, and false otherwise.
|
|
static bool select_tb_param(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
|
|
Span<const uint8_t> peer_params) {
|
|
for (uint8_t tb_param : hs->config->token_binding_params) {
|
|
for (uint8_t peer_param : peer_params) {
|
|
if (tb_param == peer_param) {
|
|
hs->ssl->s3->negotiated_token_binding_param = tb_param;
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool ext_token_binding_parse_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
|
|
uint8_t *out_alert,
|
|
CBS *contents) {
|
|
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
|
|
if (contents == nullptr || hs->config->token_binding_params.empty()) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CBS params;
|
|
uint16_t version;
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u16(contents, &version) ||
|
|
!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(contents, ¶ms) ||
|
|
CBS_len(¶ms) == 0 ||
|
|
CBS_len(contents) > 0) {
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// If the client-selected version is less than what we support, then Token
|
|
// Binding wasn't negotiated (but the extension was parsed successfully).
|
|
if (version < kTokenBindingMinVersion) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// If the client-selected version is higher than we support, use our max
|
|
// version. Otherwise, use the client's version.
|
|
hs->negotiated_token_binding_version =
|
|
std::min(version, kTokenBindingMaxVersion);
|
|
if (!select_tb_param(hs, params)) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl->s3->token_binding_negotiated = true;
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool ext_token_binding_add_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
|
|
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl->s3->token_binding_negotiated) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CBB contents, params;
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_token_binding) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16(&contents, hs->negotiated_token_binding_version) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&contents, ¶ms) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u8(¶ms, ssl->s3->negotiated_token_binding_param) ||
|
|
!CBB_flush(out)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// QUIC Transport Parameters
|
|
|
|
static bool ext_quic_transport_params_add_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
|
|
CBB *out) {
|
|
if (hs->config->quic_transport_params.empty() ||
|
|
hs->max_version <= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CBB contents;
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_quic_transport_parameters) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_bytes(&contents, hs->config->quic_transport_params.data(),
|
|
hs->config->quic_transport_params.size()) ||
|
|
!CBB_flush(out)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool ext_quic_transport_params_parse_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
|
|
uint8_t *out_alert,
|
|
CBS *contents) {
|
|
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
|
|
if (contents == nullptr) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
// QUIC requires TLS 1.3.
|
|
if (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ssl->s3->peer_quic_transport_params.CopyFrom(*contents);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool ext_quic_transport_params_parse_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
|
|
uint8_t *out_alert,
|
|
CBS *contents) {
|
|
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
|
|
if (!contents || hs->config->quic_transport_params.empty()) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
// Ignore the extension before TLS 1.3.
|
|
if (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ssl->s3->peer_quic_transport_params.CopyFrom(*contents);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool ext_quic_transport_params_add_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
|
|
CBB *out) {
|
|
if (hs->config->quic_transport_params.empty()) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CBB contents;
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_quic_transport_parameters) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_bytes(&contents, hs->config->quic_transport_params.data(),
|
|
hs->config->quic_transport_params.size()) ||
|
|
!CBB_flush(out)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Delegated credentials.
|
|
//
|
|
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-subcerts
|
|
|
|
static bool ext_delegated_credential_add_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
|
|
CBB *out) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool ext_delegated_credential_parse_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
|
|
uint8_t *out_alert,
|
|
CBS *contents) {
|
|
assert(TLSEXT_TYPE_delegated_credential == 0xff02);
|
|
// TODO: Check that the extension is empty.
|
|
//
|
|
// As of draft-03, the client sends an empty extension in order indicate
|
|
// support for delegated credentials. This could change, however, since the
|
|
// spec is not yet finalized. This assertion is here to remind us to enforce
|
|
// this check once the extension ID is assigned.
|
|
|
|
if (contents == nullptr || ssl_protocol_version(hs->ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
|
|
// Don't use delegated credentials unless we're negotiating TLS 1.3 or
|
|
// higher.
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
hs->delegated_credential_requested = true;
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Certificate compression
|
|
|
|
static bool cert_compression_add_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
|
|
bool first = true;
|
|
CBB contents, algs;
|
|
|
|
for (const auto *alg : hs->ssl->ctx->cert_compression_algs.get()) {
|
|
if (alg->decompress == nullptr) {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (first && (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_cert_compression) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&contents, &algs))) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
first = false;
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16(&algs, alg->alg_id)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return first || CBB_flush(out);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool cert_compression_parse_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
|
|
uint8_t *out_alert,
|
|
CBS *contents) {
|
|
if (contents == nullptr) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// The server may not echo this extension. Any server to client negotiation is
|
|
// advertised in the CertificateRequest message.
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool cert_compression_parse_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
|
|
uint8_t *out_alert,
|
|
CBS *contents) {
|
|
if (contents == nullptr) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const size_t num_algs =
|
|
sk_CertCompressionAlg_num(hs->ssl->ctx->cert_compression_algs.get());
|
|
|
|
CBS alg_ids;
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(contents, &alg_ids) ||
|
|
CBS_len(contents) != 0 ||
|
|
CBS_len(&alg_ids) == 0 ||
|
|
CBS_len(&alg_ids) % 2 == 1) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const size_t num_given_alg_ids = CBS_len(&alg_ids) / 2;
|
|
Array<uint16_t> given_alg_ids;
|
|
if (!given_alg_ids.Init(num_given_alg_ids)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
size_t best_index = num_algs;
|
|
size_t given_alg_idx = 0;
|
|
|
|
while (CBS_len(&alg_ids) > 0) {
|
|
uint16_t alg_id;
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u16(&alg_ids, &alg_id)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
given_alg_ids[given_alg_idx++] = alg_id;
|
|
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < num_algs; i++) {
|
|
const auto *alg = sk_CertCompressionAlg_value(
|
|
hs->ssl->ctx->cert_compression_algs.get(), i);
|
|
if (alg->alg_id == alg_id && alg->compress != nullptr) {
|
|
if (i < best_index) {
|
|
best_index = i;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
qsort(given_alg_ids.data(), given_alg_ids.size(), sizeof(uint16_t),
|
|
compare_uint16_t);
|
|
for (size_t i = 1; i < num_given_alg_ids; i++) {
|
|
if (given_alg_ids[i - 1] == given_alg_ids[i]) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (best_index < num_algs &&
|
|
ssl_protocol_version(hs->ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
|
|
hs->cert_compression_negotiated = true;
|
|
hs->cert_compression_alg_id =
|
|
sk_CertCompressionAlg_value(hs->ssl->ctx->cert_compression_algs.get(),
|
|
best_index)
|
|
->alg_id;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool cert_compression_add_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Post-quantum experiment signal
|
|
//
|
|
// This extension may be used in order to identify a control group for
|
|
// experimenting with post-quantum key exchange algorithms.
|
|
|
|
static bool ext_pq_experiment_signal_add_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
|
|
CBB *out) {
|
|
if (hs->ssl->ctx->pq_experiment_signal &&
|
|
(!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_pq_experiment_signal) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16(out, 0))) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool ext_pq_experiment_signal_parse_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
|
|
uint8_t *out_alert,
|
|
CBS *contents) {
|
|
if (contents == nullptr) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!hs->ssl->ctx->pq_experiment_signal || CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
hs->ssl->s3->pq_experiment_signal_seen = true;
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool ext_pq_experiment_signal_parse_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
|
|
uint8_t *out_alert,
|
|
CBS *contents) {
|
|
if (contents == nullptr) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (CBS_len(contents) != 0) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (hs->ssl->ctx->pq_experiment_signal) {
|
|
hs->ssl->s3->pq_experiment_signal_seen = true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool ext_pq_experiment_signal_add_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
|
|
CBB *out) {
|
|
if (hs->ssl->s3->pq_experiment_signal_seen &&
|
|
(!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_pq_experiment_signal) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16(out, 0))) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// kExtensions contains all the supported extensions.
|
|
static const struct tls_extension kExtensions[] = {
|
|
{
|
|
TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,
|
|
NULL,
|
|
ext_sni_add_clienthello,
|
|
ext_sni_parse_serverhello,
|
|
ext_sni_parse_clienthello,
|
|
ext_sni_add_serverhello,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret,
|
|
NULL,
|
|
ext_ems_add_clienthello,
|
|
ext_ems_parse_serverhello,
|
|
ext_ems_parse_clienthello,
|
|
ext_ems_add_serverhello,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,
|
|
NULL,
|
|
ext_ri_add_clienthello,
|
|
ext_ri_parse_serverhello,
|
|
ext_ri_parse_clienthello,
|
|
ext_ri_add_serverhello,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups,
|
|
NULL,
|
|
ext_supported_groups_add_clienthello,
|
|
ext_supported_groups_parse_serverhello,
|
|
ext_supported_groups_parse_clienthello,
|
|
dont_add_serverhello,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,
|
|
NULL,
|
|
ext_ec_point_add_clienthello,
|
|
ext_ec_point_parse_serverhello,
|
|
ext_ec_point_parse_clienthello,
|
|
ext_ec_point_add_serverhello,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,
|
|
NULL,
|
|
ext_ticket_add_clienthello,
|
|
ext_ticket_parse_serverhello,
|
|
// Ticket extension client parsing is handled in ssl_session.c
|
|
ignore_parse_clienthello,
|
|
ext_ticket_add_serverhello,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,
|
|
NULL,
|
|
ext_alpn_add_clienthello,
|
|
ext_alpn_parse_serverhello,
|
|
// ALPN is negotiated late in |ssl_negotiate_alpn|.
|
|
ignore_parse_clienthello,
|
|
ext_alpn_add_serverhello,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,
|
|
NULL,
|
|
ext_ocsp_add_clienthello,
|
|
ext_ocsp_parse_serverhello,
|
|
ext_ocsp_parse_clienthello,
|
|
ext_ocsp_add_serverhello,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,
|
|
NULL,
|
|
ext_sigalgs_add_clienthello,
|
|
forbid_parse_serverhello,
|
|
ext_sigalgs_parse_clienthello,
|
|
dont_add_serverhello,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms_cert,
|
|
NULL,
|
|
ext_sigalgs_cert_add_clienthello,
|
|
forbid_parse_serverhello,
|
|
ignore_parse_clienthello,
|
|
dont_add_serverhello,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,
|
|
NULL,
|
|
ext_npn_add_clienthello,
|
|
ext_npn_parse_serverhello,
|
|
ext_npn_parse_clienthello,
|
|
ext_npn_add_serverhello,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
TLSEXT_TYPE_certificate_timestamp,
|
|
NULL,
|
|
ext_sct_add_clienthello,
|
|
ext_sct_parse_serverhello,
|
|
ext_sct_parse_clienthello,
|
|
ext_sct_add_serverhello,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id,
|
|
ext_channel_id_init,
|
|
ext_channel_id_add_clienthello,
|
|
ext_channel_id_parse_serverhello,
|
|
ext_channel_id_parse_clienthello,
|
|
ext_channel_id_add_serverhello,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
TLSEXT_TYPE_srtp,
|
|
ext_srtp_init,
|
|
ext_srtp_add_clienthello,
|
|
ext_srtp_parse_serverhello,
|
|
ext_srtp_parse_clienthello,
|
|
ext_srtp_add_serverhello,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share,
|
|
NULL,
|
|
ext_key_share_add_clienthello,
|
|
forbid_parse_serverhello,
|
|
ignore_parse_clienthello,
|
|
dont_add_serverhello,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
TLSEXT_TYPE_psk_key_exchange_modes,
|
|
NULL,
|
|
ext_psk_key_exchange_modes_add_clienthello,
|
|
forbid_parse_serverhello,
|
|
ext_psk_key_exchange_modes_parse_clienthello,
|
|
dont_add_serverhello,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data,
|
|
NULL,
|
|
ext_early_data_add_clienthello,
|
|
ext_early_data_parse_serverhello,
|
|
ext_early_data_parse_clienthello,
|
|
ext_early_data_add_serverhello,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions,
|
|
NULL,
|
|
ext_supported_versions_add_clienthello,
|
|
forbid_parse_serverhello,
|
|
ignore_parse_clienthello,
|
|
dont_add_serverhello,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie,
|
|
NULL,
|
|
ext_cookie_add_clienthello,
|
|
forbid_parse_serverhello,
|
|
ignore_parse_clienthello,
|
|
dont_add_serverhello,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
TLSEXT_TYPE_quic_transport_parameters,
|
|
NULL,
|
|
ext_quic_transport_params_add_clienthello,
|
|
ext_quic_transport_params_parse_serverhello,
|
|
ext_quic_transport_params_parse_clienthello,
|
|
ext_quic_transport_params_add_serverhello,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
TLSEXT_TYPE_token_binding,
|
|
NULL,
|
|
ext_token_binding_add_clienthello,
|
|
ext_token_binding_parse_serverhello,
|
|
ext_token_binding_parse_clienthello,
|
|
ext_token_binding_add_serverhello,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
TLSEXT_TYPE_cert_compression,
|
|
NULL,
|
|
cert_compression_add_clienthello,
|
|
cert_compression_parse_serverhello,
|
|
cert_compression_parse_clienthello,
|
|
cert_compression_add_serverhello,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
TLSEXT_TYPE_delegated_credential,
|
|
NULL,
|
|
ext_delegated_credential_add_clienthello,
|
|
forbid_parse_serverhello,
|
|
ext_delegated_credential_parse_clienthello,
|
|
dont_add_serverhello,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
TLSEXT_TYPE_pq_experiment_signal,
|
|
NULL,
|
|
ext_pq_experiment_signal_add_clienthello,
|
|
ext_pq_experiment_signal_parse_serverhello,
|
|
ext_pq_experiment_signal_parse_clienthello,
|
|
ext_pq_experiment_signal_add_serverhello,
|
|
},
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
#define kNumExtensions (sizeof(kExtensions) / sizeof(struct tls_extension))
|
|
|
|
static_assert(kNumExtensions <=
|
|
sizeof(((SSL_HANDSHAKE *)NULL)->extensions.sent) * 8,
|
|
"too many extensions for sent bitset");
|
|
static_assert(kNumExtensions <=
|
|
sizeof(((SSL_HANDSHAKE *)NULL)->extensions.received) * 8,
|
|
"too many extensions for received bitset");
|
|
|
|
static const struct tls_extension *tls_extension_find(uint32_t *out_index,
|
|
uint16_t value) {
|
|
unsigned i;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < kNumExtensions; i++) {
|
|
if (kExtensions[i].value == value) {
|
|
*out_index = i;
|
|
return &kExtensions[i];
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out,
|
|
size_t header_len) {
|
|
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
|
|
CBB extensions;
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &extensions)) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Note we may send multiple ClientHellos for DTLS HelloVerifyRequest and TLS
|
|
// 1.3 HelloRetryRequest. For the latter, the extensions may change, so it is
|
|
// important to reset this value.
|
|
hs->extensions.sent = 0;
|
|
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < kNumExtensions; i++) {
|
|
if (kExtensions[i].init != NULL) {
|
|
kExtensions[i].init(hs);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
uint16_t grease_ext1 = 0;
|
|
if (ssl->ctx->grease_enabled) {
|
|
// Add a fake empty extension. See draft-davidben-tls-grease-01.
|
|
grease_ext1 = ssl_get_grease_value(hs, ssl_grease_extension1);
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16(&extensions, grease_ext1) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16(&extensions, 0 /* zero length */)) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool last_was_empty = false;
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < kNumExtensions; i++) {
|
|
const size_t len_before = CBB_len(&extensions);
|
|
if (!kExtensions[i].add_clienthello(hs, &extensions)) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ERROR_ADDING_EXTENSION);
|
|
ERR_add_error_dataf("extension %u", (unsigned)kExtensions[i].value);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const size_t bytes_written = CBB_len(&extensions) - len_before;
|
|
if (bytes_written != 0) {
|
|
hs->extensions.sent |= (1u << i);
|
|
}
|
|
// If the difference in lengths is only four bytes then the extension had
|
|
// an empty body.
|
|
last_was_empty = (bytes_written == 4);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ssl->ctx->grease_enabled) {
|
|
// Add a fake non-empty extension. See draft-davidben-tls-grease-01.
|
|
uint16_t grease_ext2 = ssl_get_grease_value(hs, ssl_grease_extension2);
|
|
|
|
// The two fake extensions must not have the same value. GREASE values are
|
|
// of the form 0x1a1a, 0x2a2a, 0x3a3a, etc., so XOR to generate a different
|
|
// one.
|
|
if (grease_ext1 == grease_ext2) {
|
|
grease_ext2 ^= 0x1010;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16(&extensions, grease_ext2) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16(&extensions, 1 /* one byte length */) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u8(&extensions, 0 /* single zero byte as contents */)) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
last_was_empty = false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) {
|
|
size_t psk_extension_len = ext_pre_shared_key_clienthello_length(hs);
|
|
header_len += 2 + CBB_len(&extensions) + psk_extension_len;
|
|
size_t padding_len = 0;
|
|
|
|
// The final extension must be non-empty. WebSphere Application
|
|
// Server 7.0 is intolerant to the last extension being zero-length. See
|
|
// https://crbug.com/363583.
|
|
if (last_was_empty && psk_extension_len == 0) {
|
|
padding_len = 1;
|
|
// The addition of the padding extension may push us into the F5 bug.
|
|
header_len += 4 + padding_len;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See RFC 7685.
|
|
//
|
|
// NB: because this code works out the length of all existing extensions
|
|
// it MUST always appear last (save for any PSK extension).
|
|
if (header_len > 0xff && header_len < 0x200) {
|
|
// If our calculations already included a padding extension, remove that
|
|
// factor because we're about to change its length.
|
|
if (padding_len != 0) {
|
|
header_len -= 4 + padding_len;
|
|
}
|
|
padding_len = 0x200 - header_len;
|
|
// Extensions take at least four bytes to encode. Always include at least
|
|
// one byte of data if including the extension. WebSphere Application
|
|
// Server 7.0 is intolerant to the last extension being zero-length. See
|
|
// https://crbug.com/363583.
|
|
if (padding_len >= 4 + 1) {
|
|
padding_len -= 4;
|
|
} else {
|
|
padding_len = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (padding_len != 0) {
|
|
uint8_t *padding_bytes;
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16(&extensions, TLSEXT_TYPE_padding) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16(&extensions, padding_len) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_space(&extensions, &padding_bytes, padding_len)) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_memset(padding_bytes, 0, padding_len);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// The PSK extension must be last, including after the padding.
|
|
if (!ext_pre_shared_key_add_clienthello(hs, &extensions)) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Discard empty extensions blocks.
|
|
if (CBB_len(&extensions) == 0) {
|
|
CBB_discard_child(out);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return CBB_flush(out);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out) {
|
|
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
|
|
CBB extensions;
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &extensions)) {
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (unsigned i = 0; i < kNumExtensions; i++) {
|
|
if (!(hs->extensions.received & (1u << i))) {
|
|
// Don't send extensions that were not received.
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!kExtensions[i].add_serverhello(hs, &extensions)) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ERROR_ADDING_EXTENSION);
|
|
ERR_add_error_dataf("extension %u", (unsigned)kExtensions[i].value);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Discard empty extensions blocks before TLS 1.3.
|
|
if (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION &&
|
|
CBB_len(&extensions) == 0) {
|
|
CBB_discard_child(out);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return CBB_flush(out);
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
|
|
const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *client_hello,
|
|
int *out_alert) {
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < kNumExtensions; i++) {
|
|
if (kExtensions[i].init != NULL) {
|
|
kExtensions[i].init(hs);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
hs->extensions.received = 0;
|
|
CBS extensions;
|
|
CBS_init(&extensions, client_hello->extensions, client_hello->extensions_len);
|
|
while (CBS_len(&extensions) != 0) {
|
|
uint16_t type;
|
|
CBS extension;
|
|
|
|
// Decode the next extension.
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &type) ||
|
|
!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension)) {
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
unsigned ext_index;
|
|
const struct tls_extension *const ext =
|
|
tls_extension_find(&ext_index, type);
|
|
if (ext == NULL) {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
hs->extensions.received |= (1u << ext_index);
|
|
uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
if (!ext->parse_clienthello(hs, &alert, &extension)) {
|
|
*out_alert = alert;
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ERROR_PARSING_EXTENSION);
|
|
ERR_add_error_dataf("extension %u", (unsigned)type);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < kNumExtensions; i++) {
|
|
if (hs->extensions.received & (1u << i)) {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CBS *contents = NULL, fake_contents;
|
|
static const uint8_t kFakeRenegotiateExtension[] = {0};
|
|
if (kExtensions[i].value == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate &&
|
|
ssl_client_cipher_list_contains_cipher(client_hello,
|
|
SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xffff)) {
|
|
// The renegotiation SCSV was received so pretend that we received a
|
|
// renegotiation extension.
|
|
CBS_init(&fake_contents, kFakeRenegotiateExtension,
|
|
sizeof(kFakeRenegotiateExtension));
|
|
contents = &fake_contents;
|
|
hs->extensions.received |= (1u << i);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Extension wasn't observed so call the callback with a NULL
|
|
// parameter.
|
|
uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
if (!kExtensions[i].parse_clienthello(hs, &alert, contents)) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_MISSING_EXTENSION);
|
|
ERR_add_error_dataf("extension %u", (unsigned)kExtensions[i].value);
|
|
*out_alert = alert;
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
|
|
const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *client_hello) {
|
|
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
|
|
int alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
if (!ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(hs, client_hello, &alert)) {
|
|
ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(hs)) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBS *cbs,
|
|
int *out_alert) {
|
|
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
|
|
// Before TLS 1.3, ServerHello extensions blocks may be omitted if empty.
|
|
if (CBS_len(cbs) == 0 && ssl_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Decode the extensions block and check it is valid.
|
|
CBS extensions;
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(cbs, &extensions) ||
|
|
!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions)) {
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
uint32_t received = 0;
|
|
while (CBS_len(&extensions) != 0) {
|
|
uint16_t type;
|
|
CBS extension;
|
|
|
|
// Decode the next extension.
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &type) ||
|
|
!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension)) {
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
unsigned ext_index;
|
|
const struct tls_extension *const ext =
|
|
tls_extension_find(&ext_index, type);
|
|
|
|
if (ext == NULL) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_EXTENSION);
|
|
ERR_add_error_dataf("extension %u", (unsigned)type);
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static_assert(kNumExtensions <= sizeof(hs->extensions.sent) * 8,
|
|
"too many bits");
|
|
|
|
if (!(hs->extensions.sent & (1u << ext_index))) {
|
|
// If the extension was never sent then it is illegal.
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_EXTENSION);
|
|
ERR_add_error_dataf("extension :%u", (unsigned)type);
|
|
*out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
received |= (1u << ext_index);
|
|
|
|
uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
if (!ext->parse_serverhello(hs, &alert, &extension)) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ERROR_PARSING_EXTENSION);
|
|
ERR_add_error_dataf("extension %u", (unsigned)type);
|
|
*out_alert = alert;
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < kNumExtensions; i++) {
|
|
if (!(received & (1u << i))) {
|
|
// Extension wasn't observed so call the callback with a NULL
|
|
// parameter.
|
|
uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
if (!kExtensions[i].parse_serverhello(hs, &alert, NULL)) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_MISSING_EXTENSION);
|
|
ERR_add_error_dataf("extension %u", (unsigned)kExtensions[i].value);
|
|
*out_alert = alert;
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
|
|
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
|
|
|
|
if (ssl->s3->token_binding_negotiated &&
|
|
!(SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support(ssl) &&
|
|
SSL_get_extms_support(ssl))) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NEGOTIATED_TB_WITHOUT_EMS_OR_RI);
|
|
ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
|
|
int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
|
|
|
|
if (ssl->ctx->servername_callback != 0) {
|
|
ret = ssl->ctx->servername_callback(ssl, &al, ssl->ctx->servername_arg);
|
|
} else if (ssl->session_ctx->servername_callback != 0) {
|
|
ret = ssl->session_ctx->servername_callback(
|
|
ssl, &al, ssl->session_ctx->servername_arg);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch (ret) {
|
|
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
|
|
ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
|
|
hs->should_ack_sni = false;
|
|
return true;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBS *cbs) {
|
|
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
|
|
int alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
if (!ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(hs, cbs, &alert)) {
|
|
ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static enum ssl_ticket_aead_result_t decrypt_ticket_with_cipher_ctx(
|
|
Array<uint8_t> *out, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cipher_ctx, HMAC_CTX *hmac_ctx,
|
|
Span<const uint8_t> ticket) {
|
|
size_t iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(cipher_ctx);
|
|
|
|
// Check the MAC at the end of the ticket.
|
|
uint8_t mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
|
|
size_t mac_len = HMAC_size(hmac_ctx);
|
|
if (ticket.size() < SSL_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN + iv_len + 1 + mac_len) {
|
|
// The ticket must be large enough for key name, IV, data, and MAC.
|
|
return ssl_ticket_aead_ignore_ticket;
|
|
}
|
|
// Split the ticket into the ticket and the MAC.
|
|
auto ticket_mac = ticket.subspan(ticket.size() - mac_len);
|
|
ticket = ticket.subspan(0, ticket.size() - mac_len);
|
|
HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, ticket.data(), ticket.size());
|
|
HMAC_Final(hmac_ctx, mac, NULL);
|
|
assert(mac_len == ticket_mac.size());
|
|
bool mac_ok = CRYPTO_memcmp(mac, ticket_mac.data(), mac_len) == 0;
|
|
#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
|
|
mac_ok = true;
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (!mac_ok) {
|
|
return ssl_ticket_aead_ignore_ticket;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Decrypt the session data.
|
|
auto ciphertext = ticket.subspan(SSL_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN + iv_len);
|
|
Array<uint8_t> plaintext;
|
|
#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
|
|
if (!plaintext.CopyFrom(ciphertext)) {
|
|
return ssl_ticket_aead_error;
|
|
}
|
|
#else
|
|
if (ciphertext.size() >= INT_MAX) {
|
|
return ssl_ticket_aead_ignore_ticket;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!plaintext.Init(ciphertext.size())) {
|
|
return ssl_ticket_aead_error;
|
|
}
|
|
int len1, len2;
|
|
if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(cipher_ctx, plaintext.data(), &len1, ciphertext.data(),
|
|
(int)ciphertext.size()) ||
|
|
!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(cipher_ctx, plaintext.data() + len1, &len2)) {
|
|
ERR_clear_error();
|
|
return ssl_ticket_aead_ignore_ticket;
|
|
}
|
|
plaintext.Shrink(static_cast<size_t>(len1) + len2);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
*out = std::move(plaintext);
|
|
return ssl_ticket_aead_success;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static enum ssl_ticket_aead_result_t ssl_decrypt_ticket_with_cb(
|
|
SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, Array<uint8_t> *out, bool *out_renew_ticket,
|
|
Span<const uint8_t> ticket) {
|
|
assert(ticket.size() >= SSL_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH);
|
|
ScopedEVP_CIPHER_CTX cipher_ctx;
|
|
ScopedHMAC_CTX hmac_ctx;
|
|
auto name = ticket.subspan(0, SSL_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN);
|
|
// The actual IV is shorter, but the length is determined by the callback's
|
|
// chosen cipher. Instead we pass in |EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH| worth of IV to ensure
|
|
// the callback has enough.
|
|
auto iv = ticket.subspan(SSL_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN, EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH);
|
|
int cb_ret = hs->ssl->session_ctx->ticket_key_cb(
|
|
hs->ssl, const_cast<uint8_t *>(name.data()),
|
|
const_cast<uint8_t *>(iv.data()), cipher_ctx.get(), hmac_ctx.get(),
|
|
0 /* decrypt */);
|
|
if (cb_ret < 0) {
|
|
return ssl_ticket_aead_error;
|
|
} else if (cb_ret == 0) {
|
|
return ssl_ticket_aead_ignore_ticket;
|
|
} else if (cb_ret == 2) {
|
|
*out_renew_ticket = true;
|
|
} else {
|
|
assert(cb_ret == 1);
|
|
}
|
|
return decrypt_ticket_with_cipher_ctx(out, cipher_ctx.get(), hmac_ctx.get(),
|
|
ticket);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static enum ssl_ticket_aead_result_t ssl_decrypt_ticket_with_ticket_keys(
|
|
SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, Array<uint8_t> *out, Span<const uint8_t> ticket) {
|
|
assert(ticket.size() >= SSL_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH);
|
|
SSL_CTX *ctx = hs->ssl->session_ctx.get();
|
|
|
|
// Rotate the ticket key if necessary.
|
|
if (!ssl_ctx_rotate_ticket_encryption_key(ctx)) {
|
|
return ssl_ticket_aead_error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_128_cbc();
|
|
auto name = ticket.subspan(0, SSL_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN);
|
|
auto iv =
|
|
ticket.subspan(SSL_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN, EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher));
|
|
|
|
// Pick the matching ticket key and decrypt.
|
|
ScopedEVP_CIPHER_CTX cipher_ctx;
|
|
ScopedHMAC_CTX hmac_ctx;
|
|
{
|
|
MutexReadLock lock(&ctx->lock);
|
|
const TicketKey *key;
|
|
if (ctx->ticket_key_current && name == ctx->ticket_key_current->name) {
|
|
key = ctx->ticket_key_current.get();
|
|
} else if (ctx->ticket_key_prev && name == ctx->ticket_key_prev->name) {
|
|
key = ctx->ticket_key_prev.get();
|
|
} else {
|
|
return ssl_ticket_aead_ignore_ticket;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hmac_ctx.get(), key->hmac_key, sizeof(key->hmac_key),
|
|
tlsext_tick_md(), NULL) ||
|
|
!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(cipher_ctx.get(), cipher, NULL,
|
|
key->aes_key, iv.data())) {
|
|
return ssl_ticket_aead_error;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return decrypt_ticket_with_cipher_ctx(out, cipher_ctx.get(), hmac_ctx.get(),
|
|
ticket);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static enum ssl_ticket_aead_result_t ssl_decrypt_ticket_with_method(
|
|
SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, Array<uint8_t> *out, bool *out_renew_ticket,
|
|
Span<const uint8_t> ticket) {
|
|
Array<uint8_t> plaintext;
|
|
if (!plaintext.Init(ticket.size())) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
return ssl_ticket_aead_error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
size_t plaintext_len;
|
|
const enum ssl_ticket_aead_result_t result =
|
|
hs->ssl->session_ctx->ticket_aead_method->open(
|
|
hs->ssl, plaintext.data(), &plaintext_len, ticket.size(),
|
|
ticket.data(), ticket.size());
|
|
if (result != ssl_ticket_aead_success) {
|
|
return result;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
plaintext.Shrink(plaintext_len);
|
|
*out = std::move(plaintext);
|
|
return ssl_ticket_aead_success;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
enum ssl_ticket_aead_result_t ssl_process_ticket(
|
|
SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> *out_session,
|
|
bool *out_renew_ticket, Span<const uint8_t> ticket,
|
|
Span<const uint8_t> session_id) {
|
|
*out_renew_ticket = false;
|
|
out_session->reset();
|
|
|
|
if ((SSL_get_options(hs->ssl) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) ||
|
|
session_id.size() > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
|
|
return ssl_ticket_aead_ignore_ticket;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
Array<uint8_t> plaintext;
|
|
enum ssl_ticket_aead_result_t result;
|
|
if (hs->ssl->session_ctx->ticket_aead_method != NULL) {
|
|
result = ssl_decrypt_ticket_with_method(hs, &plaintext, out_renew_ticket,
|
|
ticket);
|
|
} else {
|
|
// Ensure there is room for the key name and the largest IV |ticket_key_cb|
|
|
// may try to consume. The real limit may be lower, but the maximum IV
|
|
// length should be well under the minimum size for the session material and
|
|
// HMAC.
|
|
if (ticket.size() < SSL_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) {
|
|
return ssl_ticket_aead_ignore_ticket;
|
|
}
|
|
if (hs->ssl->session_ctx->ticket_key_cb != NULL) {
|
|
result =
|
|
ssl_decrypt_ticket_with_cb(hs, &plaintext, out_renew_ticket, ticket);
|
|
} else {
|
|
result = ssl_decrypt_ticket_with_ticket_keys(hs, &plaintext, ticket);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (result != ssl_ticket_aead_success) {
|
|
return result;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Decode the session.
|
|
UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> session(SSL_SESSION_from_bytes(
|
|
plaintext.data(), plaintext.size(), hs->ssl->ctx.get()));
|
|
if (!session) {
|
|
ERR_clear_error(); // Don't leave an error on the queue.
|
|
return ssl_ticket_aead_ignore_ticket;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Copy the client's session ID into the new session, to denote the ticket has
|
|
// been accepted.
|
|
OPENSSL_memcpy(session->session_id, session_id.data(), session_id.size());
|
|
session->session_id_length = session_id.size();
|
|
|
|
*out_session = std::move(session);
|
|
return ssl_ticket_aead_success;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool tls1_parse_peer_sigalgs(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, const CBS *in_sigalgs) {
|
|
// Extension ignored for inappropriate versions
|
|
if (ssl_protocol_version(hs->ssl) < TLS1_2_VERSION) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// In all contexts, the signature algorithms list may not be empty. (It may be
|
|
// omitted by clients in TLS 1.2, but then the entire extension is omitted.)
|
|
return CBS_len(in_sigalgs) != 0 &&
|
|
parse_u16_array(in_sigalgs, &hs->peer_sigalgs);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool tls1_get_legacy_signature_algorithm(uint16_t *out, const EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
|
|
switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey)) {
|
|
case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
|
|
*out = SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_MD5_SHA1;
|
|
return true;
|
|
case EVP_PKEY_EC:
|
|
*out = SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SHA1;
|
|
return true;
|
|
default:
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool tls1_choose_signature_algorithm(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint16_t *out) {
|
|
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
|
|
CERT *cert = hs->config->cert.get();
|
|
DC *dc = cert->dc.get();
|
|
|
|
// Before TLS 1.2, the signature algorithm isn't negotiated as part of the
|
|
// handshake.
|
|
if (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_2_VERSION) {
|
|
if (!tls1_get_legacy_signature_algorithm(out, hs->local_pubkey.get())) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_COMMON_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
Span<const uint16_t> sigalgs = kSignSignatureAlgorithms;
|
|
if (ssl_signing_with_dc(hs)) {
|
|
sigalgs = MakeConstSpan(&dc->expected_cert_verify_algorithm, 1);
|
|
} else if (!cert->sigalgs.empty()) {
|
|
sigalgs = cert->sigalgs;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
Span<const uint16_t> peer_sigalgs = tls1_get_peer_verify_algorithms(hs);
|
|
|
|
for (uint16_t sigalg : sigalgs) {
|
|
// SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_MD5_SHA1 is an internal value and should never be
|
|
// negotiated.
|
|
if (sigalg == SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_MD5_SHA1 ||
|
|
!ssl_private_key_supports_signature_algorithm(hs, sigalg)) {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (uint16_t peer_sigalg : peer_sigalgs) {
|
|
if (sigalg == peer_sigalg) {
|
|
*out = sigalg;
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_COMMON_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
Span<const uint16_t> tls1_get_peer_verify_algorithms(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
|
|
Span<const uint16_t> peer_sigalgs = hs->peer_sigalgs;
|
|
if (peer_sigalgs.empty() && ssl_protocol_version(hs->ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
|
|
// If the client didn't specify any signature_algorithms extension then
|
|
// we can assume that it supports SHA1. See
|
|
// http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4.1
|
|
static const uint16_t kDefaultPeerAlgorithms[] = {SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1,
|
|
SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SHA1};
|
|
peer_sigalgs = kDefaultPeerAlgorithms;
|
|
}
|
|
return peer_sigalgs;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool tls1_verify_channel_id(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, const SSLMessage &msg) {
|
|
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
|
|
// A Channel ID handshake message is structured to contain multiple
|
|
// extensions, but the only one that can be present is Channel ID.
|
|
uint16_t extension_type;
|
|
CBS channel_id = msg.body, extension;
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u16(&channel_id, &extension_type) ||
|
|
!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&channel_id, &extension) ||
|
|
CBS_len(&channel_id) != 0 ||
|
|
extension_type != TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id ||
|
|
CBS_len(&extension) != TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
|
|
ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
UniquePtr<EC_GROUP> p256(EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1));
|
|
if (!p256) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_P256_SUPPORT);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
UniquePtr<ECDSA_SIG> sig(ECDSA_SIG_new());
|
|
UniquePtr<BIGNUM> x(BN_new()), y(BN_new());
|
|
if (!sig || !x || !y) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const uint8_t *p = CBS_data(&extension);
|
|
if (BN_bin2bn(p + 0, 32, x.get()) == NULL ||
|
|
BN_bin2bn(p + 32, 32, y.get()) == NULL ||
|
|
BN_bin2bn(p + 64, 32, sig->r) == NULL ||
|
|
BN_bin2bn(p + 96, 32, sig->s) == NULL) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
UniquePtr<EC_KEY> key(EC_KEY_new());
|
|
UniquePtr<EC_POINT> point(EC_POINT_new(p256.get()));
|
|
if (!key || !point ||
|
|
!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(p256.get(), point.get(), x.get(),
|
|
y.get(), nullptr) ||
|
|
!EC_KEY_set_group(key.get(), p256.get()) ||
|
|
!EC_KEY_set_public_key(key.get(), point.get())) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
uint8_t digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
|
|
size_t digest_len;
|
|
if (!tls1_channel_id_hash(hs, digest, &digest_len)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool sig_ok = ECDSA_do_verify(digest, digest_len, sig.get(), key.get());
|
|
#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
|
|
sig_ok = true;
|
|
ERR_clear_error();
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (!sig_ok) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CHANNEL_ID_SIGNATURE_INVALID);
|
|
ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR);
|
|
ssl->s3->channel_id_valid = false;
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_memcpy(ssl->s3->channel_id, p, 64);
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool tls1_write_channel_id(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *cbb) {
|
|
uint8_t digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
|
|
size_t digest_len;
|
|
if (!tls1_channel_id_hash(hs, digest, &digest_len)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EC_KEY *ec_key = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(hs->config->channel_id_private.get());
|
|
if (ec_key == nullptr) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
UniquePtr<BIGNUM> x(BN_new()), y(BN_new());
|
|
if (!x || !y ||
|
|
!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec_key),
|
|
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec_key),
|
|
x.get(), y.get(), nullptr)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
UniquePtr<ECDSA_SIG> sig(ECDSA_do_sign(digest, digest_len, ec_key));
|
|
if (!sig) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CBB child;
|
|
if (!CBB_add_u16(cbb, TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id) ||
|
|
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cbb, &child) ||
|
|
!BN_bn2cbb_padded(&child, 32, x.get()) ||
|
|
!BN_bn2cbb_padded(&child, 32, y.get()) ||
|
|
!BN_bn2cbb_padded(&child, 32, sig->r) ||
|
|
!BN_bn2cbb_padded(&child, 32, sig->s) ||
|
|
!CBB_flush(cbb)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool tls1_channel_id_hash(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len) {
|
|
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
|
|
if (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
|
|
Array<uint8_t> msg;
|
|
if (!tls13_get_cert_verify_signature_input(hs, &msg,
|
|
ssl_cert_verify_channel_id)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
SHA256(msg.data(), msg.size(), out);
|
|
*out_len = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SHA256_CTX ctx;
|
|
|
|
SHA256_Init(&ctx);
|
|
static const char kClientIDMagic[] = "TLS Channel ID signature";
|
|
SHA256_Update(&ctx, kClientIDMagic, sizeof(kClientIDMagic));
|
|
|
|
if (ssl->session != NULL) {
|
|
static const char kResumptionMagic[] = "Resumption";
|
|
SHA256_Update(&ctx, kResumptionMagic, sizeof(kResumptionMagic));
|
|
if (ssl->session->original_handshake_hash_len == 0) {
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
SHA256_Update(&ctx, ssl->session->original_handshake_hash,
|
|
ssl->session->original_handshake_hash_len);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
uint8_t hs_hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
|
|
size_t hs_hash_len;
|
|
if (!hs->transcript.GetHash(hs_hash, &hs_hash_len)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
SHA256_Update(&ctx, hs_hash, (size_t)hs_hash_len);
|
|
SHA256_Final(out, &ctx);
|
|
*out_len = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
|
|
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
|
|
// This function should never be called for a resumed session because the
|
|
// handshake hashes that we wish to record are for the original, full
|
|
// handshake.
|
|
if (ssl->session != NULL) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static_assert(
|
|
sizeof(hs->new_session->original_handshake_hash) == EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE,
|
|
"original_handshake_hash is too small");
|
|
|
|
size_t digest_len;
|
|
if (!hs->transcript.GetHash(hs->new_session->original_handshake_hash,
|
|
&digest_len)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static_assert(EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE <= 0xff,
|
|
"EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE does not fit in uint8_t");
|
|
hs->new_session->original_handshake_hash_len = (uint8_t)digest_len;
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool ssl_do_channel_id_callback(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
|
|
if (hs->config->channel_id_private != NULL ||
|
|
hs->ssl->ctx->channel_id_cb == NULL) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY *key = NULL;
|
|
hs->ssl->ctx->channel_id_cb(hs->ssl, &key);
|
|
if (key == NULL) {
|
|
// The caller should try again later.
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> free_key(key);
|
|
return SSL_set1_tls_channel_id(hs->ssl, key);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool ssl_is_sct_list_valid(const CBS *contents) {
|
|
// Shallow parse the SCT list for sanity. By the RFC
|
|
// (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6962#section-3.3) neither the list nor any
|
|
// of the SCTs may be empty.
|
|
CBS copy = *contents;
|
|
CBS sct_list;
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(©, &sct_list) ||
|
|
CBS_len(©) != 0 ||
|
|
CBS_len(&sct_list) == 0) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
while (CBS_len(&sct_list) > 0) {
|
|
CBS sct;
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&sct_list, &sct) ||
|
|
CBS_len(&sct) == 0) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
BSSL_NAMESPACE_END
|
|
|
|
using namespace bssl;
|
|
|
|
int SSL_early_callback_ctx_extension_get(const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *client_hello,
|
|
uint16_t extension_type,
|
|
const uint8_t **out_data,
|
|
size_t *out_len) {
|
|
CBS cbs;
|
|
if (!ssl_client_hello_get_extension(client_hello, &cbs, extension_type)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*out_data = CBS_data(&cbs);
|
|
*out_len = CBS_len(&cbs);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_set_ed25519_enabled(SSL_CTX *ctx, int enabled) {
|
|
ctx->ed25519_enabled = !!enabled;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_set_rsa_pss_rsae_certs_enabled(SSL_CTX *ctx, int enabled) {
|
|
ctx->rsa_pss_rsae_certs_enabled = !!enabled;
|
|
}
|